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INTRODUCTION
A cottage industry in administrative law studies the various mechanisms by which
Congress, the President, and the courts exert control of administrative agencies. Restrictions on
the appointment and removal of personnel,1 the specification of requisite procedures for agency
decisionmaking,2 presidential prompt letters,3 ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office
of Management and Budget,4 legislative vetoes,5 and alterations in funding and jurisdiction6 all
constitute potential mechanisms for the control agency behavior. In this paper, we focus on a
much more elemental mechanism of control that has surprisingly gone relatively unnoticed in the
literature on administrative agencies: control of the timing of administrative action. 7 The use of

1

See Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal Power: Theory and Séance, 60 TENN.
L. REV. 841 (1994); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1779 (2006); Anne Joseph
O‘Connell, Qualifications (working paper 2007).
2

For overviews of the delegation literature, see generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O‘HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS
(1999); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES
AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991) (exploring the history and theory of delegation and delegation
mechanisms). On bureaucratic drift particularly, see Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431, 439 (1989) (discussing how agencies can shift policy outcomes away from the legislative intent).
3

See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1250, 1278-79 (2006); Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons
for the US and Europe, 8 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 473, 476 (2005); Robert W. Hahn & Mary Beth Muething, The Grand
Experiment in Regulatory Reporting, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 607 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2290-99 (2001).
4

See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J.
1385, 1428-36 (1992) (describing incidents of regulatory delay as a result of OMB review). For a recent discussion,
with citations to the literature, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1266-70 (2006).
5

See generally Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha and the 104th
Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 319 (1997); Robert F. Nagel, The Legislative Veto, the Constitution, and the
Courts, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 61 (1986); Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
6

See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
201 (2007).
7

But see Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies on the Costs of Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 39 ADMIN. L.
REV. 467 (1987); Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit
Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1987); Gregory L. Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness
Standards, Judicial Review of Agency Procedures, Procedural Reform, and Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAYTON. L.
REV. 71 (1979); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency
Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 72 (1997); Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law:
A Case Study of Judicial Review of Agency Inaction Under the Administrative Procedure Act 28-36 (unpublished
manuscript 2007, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming). The study of deadlines is related to the study of statutory hammers.
See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149 (1995); George A. Bermann, Administrative Delay
and its Control, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 473 (1982).
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deadlines that require agency action to commence or complete by a specific date is extremely
common in the modern administrative state. For example, statutorily specified deadlines are
found throughout much modern environmental legislation.8 Environmental statutes are hardly an
exception in this regard, but even basic descriptive statistics about the frequency and nature of
these mechanisms are lacking, much less a fully elaborated theory of regulatory deadlines. 9 This
paper offers the beginning of such a theory by providing a doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical
analysis of deadlines in administrative law.
Deadlines are important for several reasons. First, notwithstanding the plethora of
potential ways for Congress to control the bureaucracy, specifying the content of agency
rulemaking or adjudications is often difficult ex ante.10 A central premise of the administrative
state is that agencies have better information and greater expertise than the Congress that initially
delegates authority to agencies.11 Because narrow delegations eliminate agency expertise in
policy-making, it is rare that Congress demands specific content of agency decisions. Absent the
ability to regulate content directly, the most obvious way of controlling agency behavior is to
regulate either the method of agency decisionmaking or the timing of the decision. The former
has received exhaustive attention in administrative law. Structure and process scholars have long
emphasized the importance of procedural requirements from organic statutes or the
Administrative Procedure Act,12 administrative common law,13 and the Constitution.14 Related
efforts to regulate the timing of agency decisions have received virtually no attention
comparatively.15

8

See generally Environmental and Energy Study Institute & the Environmental Law Institute, Statutory
Deadlines in Environmental Legislation: Necessary But Need Improvement (Unpublished manuscript 1985).
9

The available evidence is almost exclusively focused on environmental policy, an important but far from the
only substantive context for deadlines.
10

See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
11

See Kathleen Bawn, Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative
Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); Jonathan Bendor and Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of
Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293 (2004); Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in
Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997); Steven Callander, A Theory of Policy Expertise (unpublished
manuscript, 2006); Sean Gailmard, Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Constrain Bureaucratic
Policy-Making (unpublished manuscript, 2006); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and
Endogenous Agency Expertise (John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ & Bus Paper No 553, July 2006), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=921439 (visited Mar 30, 2007).
12

See generally Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on
Regulatory Decision-Making, 14 J L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry
R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
13

See Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917 (2006); John F.
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 917 (1998).
14
15

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).

There is a small literature on the timing of judicial review and its impact on administrative law. Compare
Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and
Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 198, 233 (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE
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Second, delay is an increasingly prominent fixture in administrative law.16 A recurrent
complaint in the 1980s and 1990s about regulatory policy was that agency decisionmaking was
crumbling under burdensome and time-consuming procedural requirements of the APA and
organic statutes, as interpreted by the courts.17 When agencies act slowly, or refuse to act at all,18
courts are rarely in a position to dictate specific outcomes. Virtually the only remedy is to order
some agency action within a specified time period; that is, to impose a deadline. Although prior
scholarship has occasionally analyzed the effects of deadlines,19 the commentary contains
virtually no consistent and systematic conclusions based on empirical data about the use and
implications of deadlines in administrative law.20
Both these justifications emphasize the use of deadlines as a way of controlling agency
behavior. A third reason for study concerns the internal coherence of administrative law. A
running theme in administrative law cases and commentary is the preservation of agency
flexibility.21 Courts are typically hesitant to overrule agency decisions about whether to utilize
rulemaking or adjudication to produce policy,22 whether to utilize formal or informal methods,23
or whether to pursue a given enforcement or adjudication.24 The explanations for these doctrines
are many, but one key reason is that agencies themselves (rather than external actors) should

STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); with Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An
Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 86 (1997).
16

Compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65
(1995); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992)
with William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere
with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000);
Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
17

STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993); MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 15; Thomas
O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV.
525 (1997); McGarity, supra note 16.
18

See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Biber, supra note 7; Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review Under
APA Sections 706(1) and 706(2) (Unpublished manuscript 2007, VA. ENVTL L. REV. (forthcoming));.
19

See, e.g., Abbot, supra note 7; Magill, supra note 7.

20

The few papers of which we are aware focus either on case-studies, see, e.g., Abbott, supra note 7, or a single
agency, see, e.g., Magill, supra note 7; Daniel Carpenter et al., Deadline Effects in Regulatory Drug Review: A
Methodological and Empirical Analysis (unpublished manuscript 2007).
21

See Magill, supra note 19. For a recent variant on the theme, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional
Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002). See generally
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978) (discussing the ―very basic tenet of
administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure‖).
22

See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (―In performing its important functions . . . , an
administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.‖); Kevin M. Stack, The
Constitutional Foundation of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007).
23
24

See, e.g., United States v Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973).

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (―This Court has recognized on several occasions over many
years that an agency‘s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency‘s absolute discretion.‖).
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determine how best to allocate internal resources.25 Administrative deadlines run head-on into
these strands of doctrine because in a world of limited resources, deadlines reshuffle agency
resources from non-deadline actions to deadline actions. In certain contexts, this may be
desirable, but it is also at odds with core themes in the law of the administrative state.
Using newly assembled data, this Article establishes the frequency with which deadlines
are utilized, against which agencies they are levied, and both the direct and indirect effect of
deadlines on agency actions.26 Part I provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the use and
misuse of deadlines. We focus on the reasons Congress might choose to use timing restrictions to
control agencies rather than substantive constraints or structure and process restrictions that are
commonplace in the literature. One rational reconstruction of congressional deadline use is to
speed up agency process by trading off rapidity for the quality or structure of agency decisions.
Part II presents an empirical portrait of administrative deadlines. We present data on the
frequency, nature, and type of deadlines used to structure agency decisions. We analyze the
relationship between administrative deadlines and the duration of agency actions; deadlines
generally do increase the pace of agency action, but by relatively modest magnitudes. We also
emphasize the distribution of deadlines across agency actions; not surprisingly, deadlines tend to
be imposed on more important significant regulatory actions and the vast bulk of deadlines are
issued against a handful of administrative agencies. Out of a concern for related changes in
administrative decisionmaking, we also ask whether agency decisions constrained by deadlines
are more likely to be issued using different procedures and in point of fact, they are; deadlines
are associated with interim final rulemaking, a deviation from the ordinary mode of notice and
comment informal rulemaking.
Having offered some theory on congressional choice and empirical evidence about
agency behavior, we turn to the courts. Part III examines the way that courts address the presence
of deadlines in administrative law, surveying the use of what we call deadline doctrines. When a
statutory deadline exists, many courts excuse agency failure to use required procedures when a
deadline is present or relax the intensiveness of substantive review.27 In other contexts, the
presence of deadlines makes legal challenges both more likely to survive threshold questions and
more likely to result in agency defeats.28 And many deadline doctrines are also in tension with
standard themes in administrative law.
Against this backdrop, Part IV presents some tentative normative implications. For
example, if courts tend to exempt deadline-actions from notice and comment procedures,
agencies may avoid the costly and time-consuming process of notice and comment regulation.
To the extent that public input and reasoned agency deliberation is taken to be a desirable
attribute of the administrative state, deadlines will often undermine those goals. There are many
nuances and countervailing effects that we discuss more extensively below. Our analysis,
however, establishes a number of risks and benefits from deadlines. In any given policy domain,
25

See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 7.

26

For a more general overview and discussion, see Anne Joseph O‘Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portrait of the Administrative State (unpublished manuscript 2007, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming)).
27

See Part III, infra.

28

See id.
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deadlines can force desirable agency action, prompting welfare-maximizing or accountabilityenhancing action by recalcitrant agencies. They can, however, also produce undesirable side
effects, generating costly uncertainty and delay in domains that all parties would agree are more
important (if all parties had full information), generating lower quality decisions for deadlineconstrained actions, and shifting agency policies to less desirable modes of decisionmaking.
I. THEORY
The deadlines that constrain administrative agencies are generally imposed by Congress.
Theories of congressional choice are legion and we do not want to wed ourselves any one of
them. Perhaps congressional action is best understood from the perspective of public choice.
Alternatively, perhaps Congress should be treated as a single institutional decisionmaking or
maybe it should be disaggregated to a focus on parties or interests. Maybe the interaction
between Congress and the bureaucracy is best modeled as a principal-agent problem, but of
course these models abstract away from many institutional details. The discussion that follows is
somewhat heterogeneous in its methods, drawing on insights from many, though certainly not
all, models of congressional choice. In a sense, we are engaging in off-the-rack theorizing.
Rather than advance a specific theory of congressional choice as correct, we take the most
common theoretical framework and apply it to the context of deadlines, relaxing or expanding
certain assumptions or insights as we proceed. The analysis begins with a simplified problem of
institutional design, assuming a unitary Congress, Agency, and Court. We then relax the
assumption of unitariness and explore how intra- and inter- institutional heterogeneity affects the
use and misuse of deadlines.
A. Institutional Design
Suppose there are three actors—a Principal, and Agent, and a Monitor—that correspond
imperfectly to Congress, an administrative agency, and a court respectively. Like others before
us, we conceive of the key design problem for Congress as a four step process: (1) Delegation v.
Casework; (2) Level of Substantive Discretion, (3) Procedural Restrictions, and (4) Judicial
Enforcement. We assume that Congress prefers the policy to be implemented to be closer to its
preferences (a simple spatial model).29
Suppose the Principal seeks to accomplish some arbitrary end, for example, to address a
new policy problem. Congress must first decide whether to generate policy internally using its
own resources or externally by delegating to an agency. If Congress delegates, it must select a
level of substantive restrictions on the agency action. Substantive restrictions on agency policy
might derive from a narrow statutory mandate, from a low level of discretion (equivalently a
very high level of statutory detail), the express prohibition of certain policies, or a narrow
(broad) bound of agency jurisdiction or authority. Administrative agencies have access to
information that is not available to Congress, but that a rational principal would want the agent to
utilize in formulating policy. Congress could demand that regulatory outcomes coincide with the
enacting Congress‘ preferences, but without access to the agency‘s underlying expertise, this will
be difficult. Thus, some degree of substantive discretion almost always accompanies a statutory
delegation to the bureaucracy.

29

This simple model assumes that Congress cares about the substance of the regulatory system.
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Given a level of substantive constraint, Congress must select from a menu of familiar
procedural restrictions. An agency‘s organic statute might require that specific decision-making
procedures be utilized.30 Alternatively, the organic statute might trigger requirements of the
APA, requiring, for certain types of decisions, formal rulemaking,31 formal adjudication,32 or
informal notice and comment rulemaking. The statute might require that certain substantive
policy goals be considered prior to a final decision, as the National Environmental Policy Act
does.33 A statute might regulate the transparency of agency decisions like sunshine statutes.34 Or,
the organic statute might mandate that specifically identified actors within the bureaucracy
consider evidence and make ultimate policy decisions.35 In addition, statutes may restrict who
can serve in these decision-making positions.36 It is now conventional wisdom that restrictions
on the process by which agencies make decisions constitute a significant way for Congress to
control agency policy, and therefore agency drift and the ultimate substantive policy outcome. 37
Within the structure and process literature, temporal restrictions have received far less
attention.38
Having specified the level and type of procedural restrictions, Congress must also decide
whether to make such provisions judicially enforceable. Just as the decision to delegate to the
executive generates one set of agency problems, the decision to delegate enforcement authority
to the courts generates another.39 We remain agnostic about whether the judiciary is a faithful or
unfaithful agent of Congress.40 However, the analysis does assume that even if judges are faithful
agents, there is a nontrivial risk of judicial error such that judges may strike down agency actions
that Congress would prefer be upheld and uphold actions Congress would prefer be held
unlawful. This risk of error need not be symmetric, nor zero in expectation. However, the risk of

30

See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act.

31

See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 24 (1973).

32

Compare City of West Chicago v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 701 F.2d 632 (1983), with Union of
Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 735 F.2d 1437, 1444-45 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
33

42 U.S.C. § 4332. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). See
generally Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning From NEPA: New Guidelines for Responsible Risk
Legislation, 23 HARV. ENVL. L. REV. 93 (1999).
34

Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (unpublished manuscript, 2006);
Anne Joseph O‘Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655 (2006).
35

United States v Florida East Coast Railway, 410 US 224 (1973).

36

Anne Joseph O‘Connell, Qualifications (working paper 2007).

37

Southern Railway v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).

38

But see EPSTEIN & O‘HALLORAN, supra note 2.

39

Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).
40

See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
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error is likely higher for enforcement of substantive limitations on agencies (such as
jurisdictional determinations) than for temporal restrictions on agencies (such as deadlines).41
While courts may have different capacities to judge temporal and substantive dimensions
of agency decisions, Congress faces similar capacity constraints. We wish to emphasize this
tradeoff between the temporal dimension and the substantive dimension for Congress. Congress
has a temporal preference as well as a substantive preference. It is easier to specify and monitor
the temporal dimension, but doing so may produce shirking or reductions in quality along the
substantive dimension. To illustrate, consider a conservative Congress in favor of deregulation
and a pro-regulation agency. When Congress enacts a deregulatory statute, the agency can shirk
in one of two ways. It can pass new regulations that have the appearance of deregulating, but do
not. Or, the agency can engage in deregulation, but only after a very long delay. Congressional
choice about whether to regulate substance, timing, or procedure, depends in part on the costs of
specifying the rule ex ante and monitoring agency compliance along each dimension, ex post. An
agency might shirk either because of laziness or because of preference divergence, but in either
case it will generally be more difficult for Congress to distinguish ―good delay‖ from ―bad
delay‖ than ―good regulation‖ from ―bad regulation.‖ That is, agencies may prefer delay as a
vehicle for shirking than producing low quality regulations, in which case the importance of
statutory deadlines even greater.
Consider the effect of tandem requirements, then, of deadlines and other procedural
requirements. Suppose Congress ratchets up other procedural requirements while simultaneously
imposing a relatively quick deadline. A likely result is a decrease in the quality of agency
deliberations and decisionmaking.42 If a task that normally takes three hours must be completed
in one hour, a natural inference is that the quality of the output will be sacrificed. Indeed,
emerging empirical evidence suggests precisely this in the context of certain FDA decisions
under deadline constraints.43 If agencies must attempt to satisfy extensive procedural
requirements in an unrealistic timeframe, the quality of agency decisions will likely fall, all else
equal.44
Both the temporal effect and the substantive effects will have implications for agency
actions not guided by deadlines as well. In addition to the direct effect on timing and quality of
agency action, deadlines will also produce a shift in the internal allocation of agency resources.45
If agencies allocate resources according to the temporal priority of different programs, a close
deadline will draw resources from other policy areas; a far-off deadline will allocate resources to
other areas in the interim. If there is a correlation between timing and quality, the use of
deadlines in one policy area will affect the quality of decisions in others. In a world of limited

41

Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 10.

42

See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 1013, 1047 (2000); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1456 (1992). It is possible, however, that deadlines make it easier for an agency to act, functioning
perhaps as a necessary credible commitment device. Cf. O‘Connell, supra note 26, at 15 n.82.
43

Carpenter et al., supra note 20.

44

See id.

45

Cf. Biber, supra note 7; Pierce, supra note 7.
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resources, the agency will be forced to allocate time and energy away from agency programs
without deadlines and toward programs with deadlines.
Because of the link between timing rules and substance, deadlines can also help
legislators make an end-run around existing procedural requirements. For example, the
legislative rule doctrine in administrative law requires that certain types of agency decisions can
only be promulgated using notice and comment rulemaking.46 For legislators seeking to avoid
the lengthy process of informal rulemaking, but who (for one reason or another) prefer not to
directly exempt the agency action from notice and comment requirements,47 imposing a deadline
might obviate those requirements indirectly.48
B. Extensions
The common assumption that Congress is a unitary actor corresponds poorly to reality.
There is heterogeneity both within a given Congress as partisan and ideological differences
abound, and across Congresses over time as social views shift and controlling majorities shift
from Democrat to Republican or vice versa. Within a given Congress, partisanship is a main if
not dominant determinant of legislative behavior.49 Legislators from different states and districts
should, by design, represent different public and private interest groups. The median preferences
of the House of Representatives are typically thought to differ quite drastically from the median
preferences of the Senate.50 Modeling congressional decisionmaking then might require an
explicit focus on coalitional bargaining within the legislature.
Assume there are two coalitions in the legislature, bargaining over the terms of proposed
legislation. Just as there will be bargaining about the substantive requirements of the bill, there
will also be bargaining over procedural provisions, like whether the statute will contain a sunset
clause, a deadline for agency action, or other reporting and deliberation requirements. Sometimes
legislators will be indifferent between substance and procedure: Legislators should be willing to
trade off gains along one of these dimensions for gains along another. If the imposition of
deadlines on agencies produces a net reduction in agency effectiveness, then a legislator may be
willing to vote for a stronger substantive bill that also includes an unrealistic deadline. Other
times, the existence of a deadline clause will preclude substantive alternatives entirely. For
example, a deadline may eliminate the possibility of further study prior to action or the
46

See, e.g., John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 917 (2004); William Funk,
Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004); William Funk, When is a “Rule” a
Regulation? Marking a Clear Line between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659
(2002). Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public
Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 352; Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive
Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 542 (1977). See also Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules
Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
47

See infra note 128.

48

See Part III, infra.

49

See generally JOHN C. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

IN AMERICA (1995).
50

See John Londregan & James M. Snyder, Jr., Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences, 19 LEG. STUD.
Q. 233 (1994); Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 149 (1990).
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solicitation of comments, among other things. We do not have anything general to say about how
bargaining will tend to affect the extent of deadlines in statutes. Deadlines should, however, be
as much or as little a point of legislative bargaining as other statutory provisions.
Certain institutional actors also exert disproportionate influence on the policy process.51
For example, the committee with primary jurisdiction over a proposed bill may well undermine
the bill‘s prospects for enactment even if a majority of the floor favors it.52 If veto points like this
are real and groups of legislators exert more control over legislation than the median legislator
on the floor, actors with preferences different from those of the floor might well drive policy.
Statutory deadlines, if met, affect the timing of the distribution of benefits. Private or public
actors with varying time preferences may prefer to solidify the timing of a regulatory benefit,
even if at the cost of a higher substantive guarantee. The general point is simply that preferences
about timing trade-off against preferences about substance.
More important, just as partisan and preference divisions vary within a time period,
congressional preferences vary over time as control of the legislature shifts or social views
change. For an enacting legislative coalition, there are always at least two threats to a new
statute. The first is bureaucratic drift—the risk that agencies implementing the statute will alter
it. There is also a corresponding threat of legislative drift. A future legislature might amend or
repeal the statute when control of the legislature shifts in the future. 53 Decisions about the
content, substantive restrictions, and procedural restrictions must reflect a balance between these
two types of threats.
Deadlines balance these risks in a novel manner. The agency could be required to issue
its rule during (or soon after or not soon after) the current period Congress. In that case, the
deadline guards against bureaucratic drift by ensuring that the enacting period Congress gets to
see (and possibly object to or overrule) the final regulation. The timing rule affects monitoring as
well. By controlling the timing of agency action, deadlines allow legislators to ensure their
presence (or absence) to respond to criticism and complaints by private parties.54 Short statutory
deadlines also guard against legislative drift by ensuring that agency action is implemented
during the current Congress. Senators up for reelection in later cycles may care less about
legislative drift because they retain their seats for a longer period of time. Unlike other legislative

51

See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 59 (3d ed. 2002).
52

See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS 18 (1997).

53

See generally Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to
Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time
Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The
Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003); O‘Connell, supra note 26, at
52-53.
54

Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Police Patrol Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 165 (1984).
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tools that tend to control one type of drift at the expense of another, statutory deadlines do a
reasonable job of jointly managing both.55
Most deadlines, however, are set in one Congress and come due during a future period
Congress. Suppose the deadline is of this sort but comes due before the next Presidential
election. So long as a House or Senate election takes place during the deadline time period, the
risk of legislative drift increases, and the role of parties in managing that risk grows. Consider a
time period of frequent political turnover (high instability) during which Congress enacts
legislation authorizing the regulation of some facet of the financial services industry. Setting a
deadline for the issuance of new SEC regulations prior to the next election may provide some
greater degree of protection for the regulatory regime.56 The future legislature can always repeal
or alter the program, but once regulations have been implemented, perhaps some form of status
quo bias will make it marginally harder to eliminate them—especially during periods of divided
government.57 Similarly, within the bureaucracy certain agencies are perceived to be friendly to
business or to labor, in favor of more regulation or laissez faire. If the use of deadlines is
political, then it should vary across agencies and legislatures as well. Democratic legislatures
should use deadlines more often to constrain pro-business agencies; Republican legislatures
should use deadlines to control pro-labor or pro-environment agencies. Agencies also grow more
or less sympathetic to the views of congressional coalitions as time passes and different parties
control the Presidency.58
To the extent that statutory deadlines require judicial enforcement, the degree of
heterogeneity within the judiciary over time might make deadlines more or less attractive to
legislators as well. The willingness of judges to aggressively enforce deadlines will have an
obvious impact on the willingness of legislators to rely on deadlines. Changes in personnel or
doctrine will each affect the legislative calculus as it pertains to using deadlines.
In sum, the optimal use of deadlines by Congress will depend on how courts treat
deadlines, how agencies respond to judicial doctrines, and the underlying political dynamics
within and across the branches of government. We have argued that deadlines are an important
element of the legislative toolkit, whose use and misuse implicates core problems of institutional
design. And we have emphasized a range of relevant variables that will constrain congressional
choice about deadlines. Ultimately, however, to say that deadlines are used too much or too little,
in the right circumstances or the wrong ones, requires a systematic empirical analysis, a task we
begin in the next Part.

55

To the extent that deadlines are set and terminate during the same Congress, the timeframe for agency action
is very short. Deadlines of this sort, say 6 to 14 months, are possible, but are also precisely when courts are most
sympathetic to agency arguments that there is good cause to avoid notice and comment procedures. The short
deadline provides political benefits, but therefore also comes with some procedural costs. In part, these costs can be
compensated for by using oversight hearings and more careful monitoring of agency action.
56

Cf. O‘Connell, supra note 26.

57

See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1999).

58

In divided government, Congress may also impose unrealistic but symbolically powerful deadlines on
agencies in the hope that the public will blame the agencies for not meeting the deadlines.
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Although a nascent literature studies the use of deadlines in applied contexts,59 there is
little systematic evidence of the prevalence and implications of administrative deadlines for
agency rulemaking.60 Our theoretical discussion of administrative deadlines suggests several
potentially important effects. But the current literature lacks knowledge about even the basic
contours of deadlines. How frequently are deadlines imposed on agencies? Which agencies are
most likely to be constrained by deadlines? A basic but extremely important empirical question
is whether deadlines matter at all. Do deadlines produce faster agency decisions? If so, do
deadlines change other aspects of the administrative process by shifting agency decisionmaking
away from certain forms of conventional procedures like notice and comment and towards other
less time-consuming mechanisms? Or do deadlines reallocate resources away from nondeadline
actions toward deadline actions? Although the answers to these questions are necessarily
tentative, the analysis suggests there are critical tradeoffs between the timing of agency action,
the procedures used to make agency decisions, and the quality of regulatory policy.61
A. Descriptive Overview
1. Deadlines Over Time

59

See M.K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review, 29 J. HEALTH
POLITICS, POLICY & L. 397 (2004); Amy Whitenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected Under the Endangered Species
Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J. L. & ECON. 29 (1999); Daniel Carpenter, Groups, the Media,
Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (2002); Abbot, Case Studies, supra note 7.
60

This Article is limited to agency rulemaking. Agencies also face deadlines for adjudications, policy
statements, reports, and other actions.
61

The data are drawn from agency semiannual reports to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions, which is published in the Federal Register, from April 1983 to October 2003. For a detailed
description of the data and its advantages and limitations, see O‘Connell, supra note 26, at 20. The Unified Agenda
reports represent a successive picture of agency activity; therefore, there is considerable overlap among the semiannual reports. In other words, a rule may appear multiple times in various editions of the Unified Agenda: the first
appearance may reflect the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM); the second may indicate the end of the
commenting period, and the third may describe the final promulgation of the rule. Each appearance typically
includes all previously disclosed information. Thus, it is critical to remove duplicate entries in the analysis so
particular rulemaking actions, such as an NPRM, are counted only once. For the analysis presented here, where there
are multiple entries using the same Regulatory Identification number, a unique identifier, only the most recent
Unified Agenda report entry was kept. Agencies do not report on deadlines until the April 1987 Unified Agenda. The
information reported starting in 1987, however, contains some data on deadlines prior to 1987. Legislative and
judicial deadlines are primarily classified in the data files under one of three categories: commencement of action,
completion of action, and other. The ―commencement‖ category usually refers to deadlines for the issuance of
NPRMs. The ―completion‖ category includes mandates for completed rules (including interim final rules) and other
final agency actions (including announcements). The ―other‖ category includes such items as Advanced Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking. In addition to classifying the type of deadline, agencies often also report the date of the
deadline. Some agencies, however, do not provide dates for some of the deadlines they report. The Department of
Commerce, for example, lists a significant number of deadlines, according to the data files, but does not report many
dates for those deadlines.
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Table 1 presents the number of statutory, judicial, and total deadlines by year.62 The use
of deadlines is highest in the early 1990s, with 241 in 1991 and 256 in 1992. After that point, the
use of deadlines appears to fall off somewhat. In 1998 and 1999 there were only 89 and 60
deadlines respectively. It is tempting to say that deadlines fell off in the 1990s from a high in the
1980s, but deadlines were used extensively in the early to mid 1990s and the year 2000 saw 146
statutory deadlines. The occurrence of deadlines varies significantly from year to year, but it
does not seem to be uniformly increasing or decreasing.
The second thing to note from Table 1 is the relative composition of deadlines. In any
given year, the vast bulk of deadlines imposed on administrative agencies are statutory deadlines
rather than judicial deadlines—thus, our emphasis on congressional choice in Part I. Figure 1
presents a bar graph of deadlines over time, where the total deadlines are decomposed into
statutory and judicial deadlines. In most years, statutory deadlines constitute the vast bulk
imposed on agencies, hovering between eighty and ninety percent. However, there are
exceptions. For example, judicial deadlines constituted nearly half of all deadlines imposed in
1998 and 1999, suggesting that judicially imposed deadlines are a real and important conceptual
category, if less frequently utilized.
2. Deadlines by Agency
Table 2 disaggregates deadlines by the agency on which they were imposed. Most
agencies report few statutory or judicial deadlines during the covered time period. However, a
handful of agencies list more than 100 deadlines during this relatively brief time period. The vast
majority of all deadlines targeted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which was
subject to more than 500 deadlines during this time period. The Department of Interior received
nearly 300 deadlines as well. The Department of Transportation‘s (DOT) various subdivisions
received more than 100 deadlines. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) similarly received
more than 200 in aggregate. The Department of Defense received approximately 150 deadlines,
as did the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
For most agencies, deadlines are imposed by Congress rather than courts. There are,
however, a few obvious outliers. The Department of Interior reported 130 judicial deadlines and
only 110 statutory deadlines, suggesting an ongoing dispute with the courts. The only other
agency with significant judicially imposed deadlines is the EPA. The EPA‘s Air and Radiation
division listed 184 deadlines from the courts, and its Water division submitted information on 88
deadlines from the courts. Most of these deadlines presumably derive from the almost perpetual
litigation over rules promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
Figure 2 traces the number of statutory deadlines reported with actual dates for four
major agencies, from 1988-2003: the USDA, EPA, HHS, and DOT. A few points are
noteworthy. First, there are two evident spikes in the plot. One affects three and possibly four
agencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the USDA, DOT, EPA, and arguably HHS
(though the increase in deadlines is lower for HHS than the other three agencies). Given the
relatively steady use of deadlines throughout the other years in the sample for all agencies
62

The table contains deadline figures where the agencies reported specific dates (including month, day, and
year). Because agencies often report deadlines without specific dates, these numbers do not reflect the scope of
actual deadlines.
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(except the EPA), the graph suggests an uptick in the use of deadlines at or around the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The other spike occurs around year 2000, but only for the EPA. The other thing
to note is that there is no obvious increase or decrease in the use of deadlines over this
(admittedly short) time period. If one were to draw a regression line through these data points, it
would be very slightly downward sloping, but virtually flat. Were one to isolate single agencies,
the line would be more sharply downward sloping for the DOT and USDA. Figure 2 is useful as
an initial overview, though it masks a good deal of potential variation and information. For
example, even if the use of deadlines were flat over time, it might still be the case that rules
being targeted for deadlines differ or that agency response to deadlines changes over time.
3. Overlap of Statutory and Judicial Deadlines
Table 2 suggests that most agencies that are subject to deadlines are subject to statutory
deadlines. If judges are merely enforcing statutorily specified deadlines as opposed to creating a
different set of obligations, then it makes sense to focus most of our conceptual attention on
statutory deadlines, albeit with an emphasis on judges as potential enforcers. To explore this
question, we essentially ask whether the presence of a statutory deadline usually implies the
presence of a judicial deadline and vice versa. A low correlation between statutory and judicial
deadlines would mean that judges are rarely imposing judicial deadlines in the absence of an
existing statutory deadline. As Table 3 indicates, there is a positive and statistically significant
correlation between statutory and judicial deadlines, but the degree of correlation is modest.63 To
illustrate, consider Table 4, which presents the data on deadline overlap categorically. Of all
unique regulatory actions in the dataset, more than ninety percent are not associated with a
deadline. Six percent are associated with only statutory deadlines; just less than one percent are
associated with only a judicial deadline; and just less than one tenth of a percent are associated
with both a judicial and a statutory deadlines.64
4. Importance of Deadline Actions
If deadlines are relatively rare, as they are, then perhaps our topic is, at most,
theoretically intriguing, but practically unimportant. Evaluating this potential objection requires
knowing not just about the frequency of deadlines, however, but also their targets. If deadlines
are not only rare, but also regulate trivial agency actions, then this critique would have genuine
force. Table 5 categorizes regulatory actions according to whether or not they are ―significant.‖
Of those actions accompanied by any deadline (statutory or judicial, or both), about 34 percent
are significant regulatory actions,65 compared with about 20 percent of actions with no deadline.

63

We use three common tests: (1) Pearson correlation with a one-tailed test for statistical significance, (2)
Kendall Tau‘s B, and (3) Spearman‘s Rho. The Pearson statistic is technically inappropriate given its assumption of
normality in the underlying distribution, but we nonetheless report it as it is a commonly reported and misreported
statistic.
64

To see why this could produce a positive correlation coefficient, note that the absence of a statutory deadline
is generally associated with the absence of a judicial deadline. Thus, the two variables are positively correlated
despite the fact that only two tenths of one percent of unique RIN‘s are associated with both judicial and statutory
deadlines.
65

The law defines ―significant,‖ or ―major,‖ rules as those that have at least a $100 million, ―or otherwise
significant,‖ effect on the economy. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f) (Sept. 30, 1993). In the database created from the
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Although most agency actions are not significant actions, deadline actions are much more likely
to be significant regulatory actions than are non-deadline actions. This difference in means is
significant in an independent samples t-test.66 Another basic way to make this point is in Table 6,
which contains simple correlations between deadlines and significant regulatory actions. All
three measures produce identical coefficients and effects that are statistically significant.
Deadlines more often accompany significant regulatory actions, rather than more mundane
agency decisions.
Moreover, Congress is more likely to use deadlines to constrain regulatory actions that
impinge on core values of democratic institutions. Table 7 contains simple correlations between
underlying statutory or regulatory characteristics and the presence of an administrative
deadline.67 Each association in Table 7 is also positive; deadlines are more likely to be associated
with each of the regulatory category types. For example, deadlines are more likely when the
regulatory policy implicates state, local, or federal governmental concerns, or unfunded
mandates. The simple story is that when Congress uses a deadline, it is usually to constrain
agency actions that have a broad effect on powerfully situated political interests.
B. Changes in Agency Process
The theoretical discussion emphasized that deadlines may change the agency
decisionmaking process, shifting agency resources and perhaps even reducing regulatory quality.
To evaluate these theoretical propositions, this section considers the effects of deadlines on the
procedures used to issue policy, the extent of public participation, and the duration of agency
decisions. Deadlines significantly alter agency behavior on all three fronts.
1. Alternative Procedures
One important distortion of agency process would be less reliance on standard notice and
comment rulemaking procedures. For example, ―interim final rules‖ and ―direct final rules‖ are
two large categories of legally binding rules that are issued without prior comment.68 Table 8
Unified Agenda reports, actions were deemed significant if Priority Code=10 (Economically Significant) or 20
(Other Significant), or if Major=Yes. See O‘Connell, supra note 26, at 2 n.7, 57.
66

A t-test of the means of significant actions in the two samples (RINs with any deadline (with and without an
actual date) versus RINs with no deadline) is significant at p < 0.000. The test does not assume equal variances
between the two samples as that assumption is rejected by Levene‘s Test for Equality in Variances with Fvalue=510.865 (p-value < 0.000).
67

All the listed associations are statistically significant (p<0.001), and although we use several different
estimators to calculate the correlations, the value never varies across estimates. For this analysis, we looked only at
reports to the Unified Agenda from April 1988 to October 2003. Agencies do not report on deadlines in the Unified
Agenda until 1988. To compare the particular attributes of regulatory actions with the presence of deadlines, we had
to restrict ourselves to data where both were reported. Duplicate information was removed in the same manner as
before. See supra note 61.
68

―Direct final rules‖ become effective some time after publication in the Federal Register unless the agency
receives ―adverse‖ comments. Second, ―interim final rules‖ take effect immediately upon publication but the
agencies takes comments on them after the fact. Interim final rules are supposed to be used when the agency has
good cause to enact rules immediately, such as in emergency situations. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGC-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED
RULES 6-7 (1992); Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Tax Regulations, 44 TAX L. 343, 343–44
(1991); Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 401-02 (1999)..

Deadlines in Administrative Law

15

presents a breakdown of deadline and nondeadline actions according to the use of interim and
direct final rules.69 For purposes of discussion, focus on the second and fourth columns of the
Table. Of the class of agency actions accompanied by any deadline, 12.43 percent issued interim
final rules, compared with only 7.66 percent of actions not accompanied by a deadline.70
By displacing rules from the normal notice and comment process, deadlines seem to
change agency process at least for some portion of the underlying distribution of agency
actions.71 As the bottom half of Table 8 illustrates, direct final rules are used less often and are
significantly less likely to be used for deadline actions. In part, this is likely because direct final
rules are supposed to be used for non-significant actions and deadlines tend to get placed on
significant regulatory actions. Although the actual percentages are extremely small—all less than
one percent—the proportion of actions without a deadline for which direct rules were issued
(0.76 percent of RINs) is more than three times the proportion of actions with a deadline for
which direct rules are issued (0.17 percent of RINs).72 The simple correlation between deadlines
and interim final rules is also positive and statistically significant, and the simple correlations
between deadlines and direct final rules is negative and statistically significant, as Table 9 shows.
2. Extent of Public Participation
Different procedures do not necessarily mean lower quality decisions. Deadlines may,
however, produce distortions of traditional commenting and public participation in agency
decisionmaking, undermining the administrative process.73 Deadlines are actually associated
with more extensive comment periods.74 This may appear counterintuitive, but recall that
deadlines are more often associated with significant actions, and significant actions tend to have
more extensive comment periods than non-significant actions. The real question is whether
within the class of significant regulatory actions, those associated with deadlines generate more
comments or less comments. Among significant actions, deadline actions are issued with
significantly fewer comment periods.75 Within the relevant subset, deadlines produce less public
69

On direct rules, see Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995).

70

A t-test of the means of interim final rules in the two samples (RINs with any deadline (with and without an
actual date), RINs with no deadline) is significant at p < 0.001. The test does not assume equal variances between
the two samples as that assumption is rejected by Levene‘s Test for Equality in Variances with F-value=296.792 (pvalue < 0.000).
71

This is not to say that all interim or direct final rules are of low quality. If, however, notice and comment is
taken as the appropriate baseline, downward procedural deviations from that norm will be more likely to produce
errors.
72

The difference is significant. A t-test of the means of direct rules in the two samples (RINs with any deadline
(with and without an actual date), RINs with no deadline) is significant at p < 0.000. The test does not assume equal
variances between the two samples as that assumption is rejected by Levene‘s Test for Equality in Variances with Fvalue=53.503 (p-value < 0.001).
73

See generally Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005).
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The two variables are significantly correlated, with a simple correlation coefficient between 0.041 and 0.049
(depending on the estimator). The ―comments‖ variable‘s value increases by one for a new comment period, a
reopened comment period, or an extended comment period.
75

The mean number of comment periods for significant regulatory actions with deadlines is 0.673 and the mean
number of comment periods for significant regulatory actions without deadlines is 0.824. Not every significant
action has a comment period in actuality; for instance, an agency could issue a significant regulation as an interim
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input and less agency process, two variables typically associated with higher quality agency
decisions. At a minimum, deadlines involve a tradeoff between the pace of agency action and the
extent of the decisionmaking process.
3. Duration of Agency Actions
Because deadlines are a proposed solution to the problem of agency delay, an important
question is whether deadline actions actually take less time to complete than nondeadline
actions? If deadlines do not even alter the timing of agency decisions, then the range of potential
negative side effects is all the more concerning. Table 11 provides basic correlations between
duration, deadlines, and regulatory significance.76 Significant regulatory actions are longer and
deadline actions are shorter than non-deadline actions. Expressed differently, the average
duration for rulemakings with an NPRM that end in a final action, either traditional final rule or
interim or direct final rule, but do not have any deadline reported, is 518.96 days (95 percent
confidence interval ranges from 501.34 to 536.57 days). By contrast, the average duration for
rulemakings with an NPRM that end in a similar final action, but do have a deadline, is 426.77
days (95 percent confidence interval ranges from 394.15 to 459.40).77
Table 12 presents disaggregated results for the agencies facing the most deadlines.
Deadlines shorten duration for all these agencies, but in many cases the effect is relatively
modest. The average duration of USDA non-deadline action is 422 days versus 406 days for
deadline actions. EPA non-deadline actions taken an average of 603 days versus 591 days for
non-deadline actions. The difference for DOT is somewhat larger, 586 days with no deadlines
versus 520 days with deadlines. But for HHS, deadlines seem to have a very large effect. HHS
deadline-actions are completed in an average of 457 days, while non-deadline actions take an
average of 912 days. Although preliminary, these data suggest that deadlines reduce the duration
of HHS action by more than 50 percent, but for many other agencies, deadlines reduce average
length of action only modestly.
These results are suggestive, but to say anything rigorous about differential duration,
multivariate analysis is needed. We therefore estimate a competing risks Cox proportional hazard
model.78 Duration or hazard models estimate the hazard rate, here, the instantaneous rate at

final rule, with no previous comment periods. Also, agencies may not report comment periods to the Unified
Agenda.
76

As an indicator of duration, we compute the time between the initial NPRM and a traditional final rule or
final action. In the database created from the Unified Agenda reports, actions were counted as a final rule or action if
the rulemaking action listed in the Timetable field was coded as 330=Final Rule or 600=Final Action. See
O‘Connell, supra note 26, at 57. For this analysis, we looked only at reports to the Unified Agenda from April 1995
to October 2003 and kept RINs only if they had a NPRM with an actual date reported. Agencies do not report on
significance of actions, a key explanatory variable, until 1995. Duplicate RINs were removed in the same manner as
before. See supra note 61.
77
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The confidence intervals around these means do not overlap.

For this analysis, we looked only at reports to the Unified Agenda from April 1995 to October 2003 and kept
RINs only if they had a NPRM with an actual date reported. Agencies do not report on significance of actions, a
kept explanatory variable, until 1995. Duplicate RINs were removed in the same manner as before. See supra note
61.
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which an agency action ends after time t, given that the agency action has been ongoing until t.79
The basic question here is simply whether deadlines increase the hazard rate, or put differently,
shorten the duration of agency actions.80 Positive coefficients predict shorter duration and
negative coefficients predict longer duration. The results are presented in Table 13, along with
coefficient estimates from several alternative specifications.81
79

For good statistical sources on hazard analysis, see William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (2d ed. 1993);
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones, Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science,
41 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1414 (1997).
80

Hazard analysis differs from standard ordinary least squares analysis in that it treats the dependent variable—
length of rulemaking process (in days)—as a temporal variable, which permits the inclusion of censored
observations and avoids the prediction of negative duration. See Greene, supra note 79. Unlike the exponential,
lognormal, log-logisitic, or Weibull hazard models, the Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) model does not impose a
particular functional form on the baseline hazard function. The model does, however, assume that the
proportionality of hazards across cases does not vary over time. In other words, hazard functions of any two
individuals with different covariate values differ only by a proportional factor. See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier &
Christopher J.W. Zorn, Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 972
(2001). The hazard rate for case i with the CPH model is hi (t )  e

 ' xi

h0 (t ) where β’xi is the matrix of coefficients

and covariates for the ith case and h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate. Due to the model‘s partial likelihood estimation,
the baseline hazard function is estimated nonparametrically. See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones,
Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1414, 1433 (1997). The
competing risks aspect of the CPH model accounts for the fact that an NPRM in the Unified Agenda can result in
one of several ultimate outcomes: traditional final rule or action; interim final rule; direct final rule; or deletion or
withdrawal. To estimate the current model, we compress these outcomes into two categories: final rule (traditional,
interim, or direct) or deletion/withdrawal. In the data used here, 5748 RINs show a traditional final rule or action as
the ultimate outcome; 70 RINs show an interim final rule as the ultimate outcome; 4 RINs show a direct final rule as
the ultimate outcome; 839 RINs show deletion or withdrawal as the ultimate outcome; and 2289 RINs with an
NPRM show no outcome. This final category of RINs is treated as censored. The average duration for final
rules/actions (with and without deadlines, significant and non-significant) was 506.35 days (613.66 days, standard
deviation); for interim final rules was 685.6 days (957.61); for direct final rules was 1219.25 days (526.1); and for
withdrawals was 1541.28 days (1380.14). Many competing risk hazard models stratify the data by outcome types,
permitting the baseline hazard function to vary by stratum, but constraining the regression coefficients to be
identical across strata. This approach, without the inclusion of explanatory variables dependent on particular strata,
is problematic for our data. For example, we want to consider whether a change in party control in Congress
between an NPRM and final outcome explains any of the variation in duration of the regulatory process. Change in
party control of Congress likely has opposing effects on duration, depending on the outcome. Change in party
control likely has a negative effect on duration (i.e., makes it shorter) if the NPRM ends in withdrawal; indeed, a
significant number of NPRMs are withdrawn after control in Congress shifted in January, 1995. See O‘Connell,
supra note 26, at 42-45. But change in party control probably has a positive effect on duration if the NPRM ends in
a rule. Agencies started off the rulemaking pleasing one set of members; now, they have to make changes before
they finish it for pleasing the current set of members. To deal with this concern, many of the explanatory variables
are included on their own and as interaction variables with one of the two strata.
81

We tested the competing risks model‘s key assumption that the proportionality of hazards across cases does
not vary over time within each stratum. Because the model incorporates competing risks, standard tests of the
proportionality assumption in commercial statistical packages are not appropriate (for example, the stphtest
command in Stata). Instead, we plotted the observed and predicated survival probabilities for each of the competing
risks (i.e., rule completions and rule withdrawals); if the observed and predicted probabilities are close, the model‘s
assumption is supported. The probabilities are very close for rule completions over all values of the duration
variable and close for rule withdrawals for shorter durations (but widening for longer durations), confirming that the
key assumption holds for at least one stratum and partially for the second. Although we think the CPH model is most
appropriate in this setting, we have also estimated a series of alternative specifications using different methods. The
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First, and most important, the presence of any deadline shortens the duration of the
regulatory process.82 Holding constant the effect of other covariates, deadlines do shorten the
time frame in which agencies issue policy. Although deadlines produce other side effects, they
do quicken the pace of agency decisions.83 These coefficients do not directly map onto measures
of the actual change in duration. Keeping all explanatory covariates at their means, the odds of a
rulemaking with a deadline coming to an end (either in a completed rule or in a withdrawal)
before a rulemaking without a deadline are 1.43 to 1.84 Second, significant regulatory actions
take longer to complete or withdraw. Rules with bigger impacts tend to take longer to complete.
Third, if the President changes after the NPRM is issued, the regulatory process is longer than if
there is no Presidential change. And this result holds regardless of whether the process ends in a
rule or withdrawal. Moreover, rules started under President Carter and President George H.W.
Bush take longer to reach completion than rules started under President Clinton. Fourth,
Congress matters, in interesting ways. If the party in control of Congress changes after the
NPRM is issued, the rulemaking process is longer if the process ends in completion. But the
process is shorter if the rule is deleted or withdrawn. Put differently, when the Republicans took
over Congress in 1995, there were two effects on pending rules. For rules that were ultimately
issued, there was greater delay. But some rules were also quickly withdrawn—more quickly than
withdrawn rules absent a shift in congressional control. Interestingly, however, there is no
significant relationship between the duration of the regulatory process and whether that process
starts during a period of united or divided government. In summary, deadlines do produce faster

simplest, and least appropriate, is a simple OLS regression equation of the number of duration of agency actions on
the set of explanatory variables (excluding the interaction terms). A poisson regression is somewhat more
appropriate because the distribution of the dependent variable. We also estimated other duration models using both
the Weibull and the exponential distributions, as well as a Cox proportionate hazard model without the competing
risks specification. The results are robust to all these alternative specifications.
82

The existence of a deadline, however, lengthens the regulatory process when that process ends in withdrawal
of an NPRM. This result may appear surprising at first. But it also has an intuitive explanation. Deadlines are
supposed to force agencies to act, to enact some sort of regulation. To not complete a rulemaking, indeed to
withdraw a regulatory action, in the face of a deadline is highly unusual. See Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the
Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress
Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 562 (finding that the EPA was less likely to withdraw a rulemaking with a
deadline). An agency would not undertake such an action lightly and thus would likely take more time before
choosing that outcome.
83

This effect may be biased downward. To the extent that agencies may set internal deadlines for particular
rulemakings in the absence of statutory deadlines, non-deadline rulemaking processes will have a shorter duration
than otherwise. In addition, to the extent that Congress signals to the agency important rulemakings that should be
finished promptly without the imposition of deadlines, non-deadline actions will taker less time. Cf. Cornelius M.
Kerwin & Scott Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
113, 129, 132 (1992) (without considering statutory deadlines, finding that judicial deadlines lengthen the EPA‘s
rulemaking process using an OLS regression).
84

This measure is obtained by calculating the expected hazard ratio with the deadline covariate set to one and
all other covariates set to their means and the expected hazard ratio with the deadline covariate set to zero and all
other covariates set to their means. These ratios are, respectively, 0.333 and 0.233; the odds reported in the text are
calculated by taking their ratio.
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regulatory action, but this effect interacts in surprising ways with other sources of political and
institutional variation.85
III. DEADLINE DOCTRINES
Administrative law is forced to deal with deadlines in a wide range of contexts, and in
many, either the deadline distorts the ordinary doctrinal contours, or standard doctrines produce
counterproductive agency behavior. These negative results are not inevitable, but they are
frequent enough to cause genuine concern about the ability of deadlines to control agencies. This
Part canvasses how several standard administrate law doctrines address the presence of a
statutory deadline. First, it considers how deadlines provide a rare opportunity for parties to
successfully sue for agency inaction under Section 706(1) of the APA. Second, it examines
procedural and substantive challenges to agency actions enacted in the face of deadlines. If an
agency promulgates a rule required by a deadline but fails to use traditional notice and comment
procedures, many courts will strike down such action on procedural grounds, rejecting any ―good
cause‖ exception to notice and comment requirements of section 553 of the APA. When an
agency‘s statutory interpretation is challenged in the standard framework of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,86 a deadline will likely make it harder for an agency
to emerge victorious. When agency actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious, deadlines
have an ambiguous effect. Little caselaw exists and facially plausible arguments that we discuss
suggest it could be easier or harder for an agency to win in litigation. Third, this part explores
how deadlines affect the authority of courts to fashion remedies when agencies do not meet their
obligations, and considers whether deadlines present any constitutional problems. Although
statutory deadlines are generally assumed to be legally uncontroversial, we emphasize several
reasons that deadlines might be constitutionally suspect.
A. Agency Inaction

85

Although agencies make quicker decisions if they confront deadlines, all else being equal, they often miss the
deadlines themselves. Of the 226 unique rulemakings with specific dates of a statutory deadline for an NPRM to be
issued and for the actual issuance of the NPRM, the agency met the deadline in only 26.5 percent of the cases. For
the subset of 48 significant rulemakings, the agency satisfied the NPRM deadline in 12.5 percent of the cases. The
mean difference in days between the NPRM deadline and the actual NPRM was 178.5 days (past the deadline)
(standard deviation=471.3); for significant actions, the mean difference was 270.7 days (standard deviation=460.5).
Of the 1,245 unique rulemakings with specific dates of a statutory deadline for completed regulatory action for the
actual completion, the agency met the deadline in only 18.4 percent of the cases. For the subset of 229 significant
rulemakings, the agency satisfied the completion deadline in 21.4 percent of the cases. The mean difference in days
between the completion deadline and the actual completion was 339.1 days (past the deadline) (standard
deviation=637.0); for significant actions, the mean difference was 544.3 days (standard deviation=811.6). The
EPA‘s pattern of missing deadlines has been well documented. See United States Government Accountability
Office, Clean Air Act: EPA Should Improve the Management of Its Air Toxics Program, GAO-06-669 (June 2006);
United States Government Accountability Office, Clean Air Act: EPA Has Completed Most of the Actions Required
by the 1990 Amendments, but Many Were Completed Late, GAO-05-613 (May 2005); Steven J. Groseclose,
Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s Clean Air Act Rulemaking
Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 529, 560-64 (1994) (noting that court deadlines are less likely to be
missed than statutory deadlines); Pierce, supra note 7, at 82.
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467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Federal courts generally have extremely limited jurisdiction to ―compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed‖ under Section 706(1) of the APA. 87 In Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court ruled that ―a claim under § 706(1) can
proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it
is required to take.‖88 In that case, the Court refused to allow environmental groups to challenge
the Bureau of Land Management‘s failure to limit off-road vehicle use on public lands under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.89 The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
Court, however, explicitly indicated that statutory deadlines could establish the discrete
mandatory action needed to bring a challenge under Section 706(1),90 a view consistent with
previous lower court decisions.91 Deadlines stand out as one of the few areas where courts will
compel agencies to act despite multiple demands on their resources.
The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance analysis is part of the Court‘s general
administrative law doctrine, but specific statutes also carve out jurisdiction for courts to review
agency inaction. Under the Clean Air Act, citizen suits are expressly permitted, presuming
standing and other jurisdictional requirements are met, ―against the Administrator [of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary . . . .‖92 Many district courts
have held that missed statutory deadlines in the Clean Air Act satisfy this citizen suit provision.93
The Clean Water Act has an identical provision.94 And, as with the Clean Air Act, many district
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See, e.g., William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979,
993 (2004); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1657, 1657 (2004). See also Biber, supra note 7.
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542 U.S. at 64.

89

Id. at 65-73.

90

542 U.S. at 9.
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In Sierra Club v. Thomas, the D.C. Circuit explained how a deadline is almost always necessary to create a
nondiscretionary duty:
Although a date-certain deadline therefore may or may not be nondiscretionary, it is highly improbable that a
deadline will ever be nondiscretionary, i.e. clear-cut, if it exists only by reason of an inference drawn from the
overall statutory framework. . . . The inferable deadline is likely to impose such a discretionary duty because it
rests, at bottom, upon a statutory framework that will almost necessarily place competing demands upon the
agency‘s time and resources.
828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir 1987) (footnotes omitted). The court continued: ―In the absence of a readilyascertainable deadline, therefore, it will be almost impossible to conclude that Congress accords a particular agency
action such high priority as to impose upon the agency a ―categorical[ ] mandat[e]‖ that deprives it of all discretion
over the timing of its work.‖ Id.; cf. Raymond Proffitt Foundation v. U.S. E.P.A., 930 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(deadline may be sufficient but is not necessary to show non-discretionary duty).
92

42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2).
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See, e.g., Environmental Defense v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2004); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 797 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 602 F.Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
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courts have ruled that an agency‘s failure to meet a statutory deadline qualifies under this
provision as well.95
There are, however, substantial limits on the scope of judicial review of agency inaction,
even if deadlines generally make it easier for parties to win ―unreasonable delay‖ cases on the
margin.96 Parties must meet applicable statutes of limitations,97 have standing to sue,98 and bring
a live case.99 Most critical, in agency inaction suits involving deadlines where ―the manner of . . .
action is left to the agency‘s discretion,‖ courts ―can compel the agency to act, but [have] no
power to specify what the action must be.‖100 A statutory deadline therefore may spur a court to
order the agency to act, but will almost never allow the court to specify the content of that
action.101
B. Late Agency Action
If the agency imposes legal obligations once the deadline has passed, does the presence
of the deadline nullify the agency‘s action? The Supreme Court‘s most recent pronouncement
was a clear no—at least unless Congress clearly specifies otherwise—but the Court was sharply
split. In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Company, the Court upheld the Commissioner of Social
Security‘s untimely assignment of beneficiaries to coal companies for the payment of health
95

See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 888 F.Supp. 1005 (D. Ariz. 1995).

96

Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 7, at 29.

97

In Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that environmental groups could not bring a lawsuit to mandate that the Secretary of Interior designate a critical
habitat for two endangered species of minnows under the Endangered Species Act because the Secretary‘s failure to
act was not a continuing violation that extended beyond the statute of limitations. Generally, if the statute does not
otherwise specify, parties have six years after a deadline has passed to challenge agency inaction. 28 U.S.C. §
2401(a); Center for Biological Diversity, 453 F.3d at 1334.
98

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). Proving standing, under
current precedent, can be quite difficult, particularly when the agency‘s inaction does not concern regulation of the
plaintiffs themselves. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562; cf. Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 12-25 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
99

Challenges to compel agency action will also typically become moot once the agency acts, even if far beyond
the deadline, because after the agency acts, the court cannot ―grant any relief beyond requiring steps that [the
agency] has already taken . . . .‖ Sierra Club v. Browner, 130 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 11 (1992).
100

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004) (―For example, 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1),
which required the Federal Communications Commission ‗to establish regulations to implement‘ interconnection
requirements ‗[w]ithin 6 months‘ of the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, would have
supported a judicial decree under the APA requiring the prompt issuance of regulations, but not a judicial decree
setting forth the content of those regulations.‖).
101

Challenges to agency inaction based on missed deadlines also present interesting jurisdictional questions as
to what level of court should first hear such claims. Those challenges are typically heard in district court, in contrast
to claims involving agency action. Many statutes, including the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, prescribe that
parties must first try to set aside an agency action in the Court of Appeals. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 752-53 (6th ed. 2006). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Clean
Air Act appellate jurisdiction for challenges to particular agency actions); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (similar provision
for Clean Water Act).
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insurance premiums under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992. 102 The Court
acknowledged that the Commissioner ―had no discretion to choose to leave the assignments until
after the prescribed date, and [that] the assignments in issue here represent a default on a
statutory duty, though it may well be a wholly blameless one.‖103 But the Court refused to strike
down the Commissioner‘s dilatory action as lacking legal authority because the Coal Act does
not explicitly provide for what would happen in such a case. As the Court concluded, ―‗if a
statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the
federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.‘‖104 Lower
courts have generally upheld binding agency policies enacted after a statutory deadline has
passed, so long as the statute does not spell out explicit consequences for late action.105 What
courts then struggle with is determining whether the statute provides such consequences.106
Although this doctrinal result is clear enough, it is also subject to criticism. Suppose a
statute grants legal authority to a new agency pursuant to the statute, but also sunsets at the end
of the year. The most plausible inference is that the agency has no power after the source of its
legal authority terminates. Why should deadlines be different? After all, deadlines require that
an agency take some action by a certain date; prior to that date the action is presumptively
lawful, but after the date, the agency is acting in contravention of the legal authority for its
action. Under this view, late action in the face of a deadline does not seem all that different in
kind from late agency action after the sunset of a statute. However, missing a deadline in a broad
statutory scheme also seems distinct from the expiration of a narrow grant of statutory authority.
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537 U.S. 149 (2003).

103

Id. at 157.
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Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)). The Peabody
Court relied on another missed statutory deadline case, Brock v. Pierce County. In that case, which involved late
action by the Secretary of Labor, the Court was extremely hesitant ―to conclude that every failure of an agency to
observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at
stake.‖ 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986). The Court reasoned: ―When, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for
failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to
act.‖ Id. The Supreme Court in Peabody and Pierce County did not explicitly discuss laggard agency action in terms
of the APA. If an agency misses a mandatory deadline without justification, such late action would arguably qualify
as ―an abuse of discretion‖ under Section 706(2)(A) of the APA. Cf. International Union v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249 (3d
Cir. 2004) (finding missed deadline not an abuse of discretion because the deadline was aspirational, not
mandatory); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep‘t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same). But if the
agency has acted, albeit late, a Section 706(2)(A) challenge likely will be moot or provide no considerable remedy.
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See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass‘n v. United States Forest Service, 113 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1997)
(―Absent specific statutory direction, an agency's failure to meet a mandatory time limit does not void subsequent
agency action.‖); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 938 F.2d 1299, 1304
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (―We are especially reluctant to so curb EPA‘s substantive authority [to add sites to the National
Priority Lists] in light of Supreme Court decisions declining to restrict agencies‘ powers when Congress has not
indicated any intent to do so and has crafted less drastic remedies for the agency‘s failure to act.‖)
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See, e.g., Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 171 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d Barnhart
v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003). Late agency action may raise additional concerns if the agency wants its
action to apply retroactively. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 216, 224-25 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (―If, for example, a statute prescribes a deadline by which particular rules must be in effect, and if the
agency misses that deadline, the statute may be interpreted to authorize a reasonable retroactive rule despite the
limitation of the APA.‖).
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Regardless, this deadline doctrine on late action highlights the importance of hammer provisions,
which specify regulatory outcomes in the event that an agency fails to meet a statutory
deadline.107 Hammer provisions can implement ―a congressionally specified regulatory
result.‖108 Or hammer provisions can implement an agency‘s proposed rule if the agency does
not promulgate the final rule before the deadline.109 These provisions often impose ―hars[h]
default prohibitions‖ to motivate quicker agency action.110 In sum, the absence of a
congressionally specified hammer will generally prevent courts from striking down agency
action simply for missing a deadline.
C. Procedural Challenges
Deadlines impose significant constraints on agency resources, and therefore, agencies
often forego notice and comment rulemaking (detailed in Section 553 of the APA) for deadline
driven actions. And because most deadlines guide significant regulatory actions or legislative
rules, notice and comment is the default procedural requirement. The APA, however, excepts
notice and comment requirements for ―good cause.‖ Agencies faced with deadlines often
contend that deadlines require pressed work, making ―notice and public procedure thereon . . .
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.‖111
Much of the considerable case law in this area concerns the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act.112 In 1978, after receiving plans from states designating areas as compliant and
non-compliant with national ambient air quality standards for various air pollutants, the EPA
Administrator promulgated a rule without prior comment, modifying those plans and imposing
various obligations under the Act. Five courts of appeals ruled that the Administrator did not
have the requisite ―good cause‖ to eschew the APA‘s notice and comment provisions;113 two
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JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 15-16 (4th ed. 2006); M. Elizabeth
Magill, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act’s Hammer
Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 153-57 (1995); Richard C. Fortuna, The Birth of the Hammer, ENVTL.
FORUM, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 18, 20. Such provisions are more popular in divided government. Cf. id.
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LUBBERS, supra note 107, at 16 (discussing the hammer provision in the 1984 Amendments to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1)-(2)).
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Magill, supra note 7, at 150 (explaining the hammer provisions in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
of 1990).
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Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 883
(2006); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80
IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 n.40 (1994).
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5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
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See LUBBERS, supra note 107, at 111; Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good Cause”
Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 125-29 (1984).
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United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 649 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1981); Western Oil &
Gas Ass‘n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980); New Jersey v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597
F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.
1979); see also Jordan, supra note 112, at 127-28.
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courts of appeals sustained the Administrator‘s choice of harried procedure. 114 The first set of
courts emphasized that the Administrator had sufficient time to provide notice on the proposals
and to take comment before promulgating a final rule.115 Many of the courts also argued that the
agency did not treat the statutory deadline as ―sacrosanct‖ since the agency published the final
rule a month after the deadline.116 They also rejected the agency‘s argument that the opportunity
provided for comments after the rule was promulgated cured any procedural problems.117 For
these courts, the EPA had failed to meet its burden to show why it met the narrow ―good cause‖
exemption to notice and comment rulemaking.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits accepted the EPA Administrator‘s reliance on the ―good
cause‖ exemption. Both courts concluded that the statutory deadline made prior notice and
comment impractical. The Sixth Circuit concluded that courts that had reached the opposite
holding ―appear to us to ignore the sense of urgency which characterized the congressional
debate preceding the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.‖118 The Seventh Circuit
similarly ruled that ―the ‗good cause‘ exception may be utilized to comply with the rigors of a
tight statutory schedule.‖119 These two courts were therefore not troubled by the agency‘s
provision of post-rule commenting.120 Finally, the courts emphasized that upholding the agency‘s
114

Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court refused to resolve the circuit split. See United
States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (denying certiorari).
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Sharon Steel Corp., 597 F.2d at 380 (footnotes omitted). These courts emphasized that the Administrator
gave no reason for ―why it could not at least have published the . . . initial list[s] upon receipt and accepted
comments during the time it was reviewing the list[s].‖ United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979). Such quick action ―would have afforded petitioners some warning of the
imminent designations and allowed them opportunity to influence the agency‘s action.‖ Id.; see also New Jersey,
626 F.2d at 1047.
116

United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d at 213; see also New Jersey, 626
F.2d at 1043 n.3; Sharon Steel Corp., 597 F.2d at 379 n.4. And they pointed to the agency‘s repeated remarks that
the designations in the final rule were ―preliminary‖ in the statute‘s regulatory scheme, suggesting the agency could
have issued the designations as a proposed rule. New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042.
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United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1979)
(―Were we to allow the EPA to prevail on this point we would make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable.
An agency that wished to dispense with pre-promulgation notice and comment could simply do so, invite postpromulgation comment, and republish the regulation before a reviewing court could act.‖). See also Steel Corp., 597
F.2d at 381; New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1038.
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Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 803 (6th Cir. 1980). The Sixth Circuit did not find the issue
close: ―If the circumstances of this case do not justify employment of the good cause exception, we will be hard put
to find any justification for its use.‖ Id.
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United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 605 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1979). These two
courts were therefore not troubled by the agency‘s provision of post-rule commenting. Republic Steel Corp., 621
F.2d at 804 (―Under these circumstances, we think that the Administrator's solution of promulgating a schedule of
nonattainment areas and subsequently receiving objections and comment, and thereafter effecting such changes as
were required, was a reasonable approach consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act.‖).
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Republic Steel Corp., 621 F.2d at 804 (―Under these circumstances, we think that the Administrator's
solution of promulgating a schedule of nonattainment areas and subsequently receiving objections and comment,
and thereafter effecting such changes as were required, was a reasonable approach consistent with the
Administrative Procedures Act.‖).
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harried procedures served the public interest.121 The Sixth Circuit put it bluntly: ―Past experience
has taught this court that remand means an additional two-year delay in achieving national air
quality standards in Ohio.‖122
In lieu of a bright-line rule on deadlines and good cause, courts typically apply a multifactor analysis in assessing whether an agency can rely on a deadline to forego traditional notice
and comment procedures.123 Courts permit agencies to deviate from standard APA rulemaking
procedures if the deadline is ―very tight and where the statute is particularly complicated.‖124 But
the agency cannot generally create its own emergency by not acting until quite close to the
deadline.125 Courts are also more accommodating to missed procedural mandates if the agency
action is ―of limited scope or duration.‖126 Finally, courts ―giv[e] greater weight to congressional
deadlines in justifying lack of notice and comment when the deadlines implemented budgetcutting measures.‖127 In short, agencies must exercise care in skipping notice and comment
procedures, but if the ordinary requirements of notice and comment are truly burdensome given
time constraints from the statute, the agency‘s decision to avoid costly and time-consuming
procedures is likely to be upheld.128
D. Substantive Challenges
Deadlines also significantly affect how courts engage in substantive review of agency
decisions. Explicit deadlines often make it easier for the reviewing court to find related language
121

As the Seventh Circuit explained: ―We have already noted the Congressional concern manifest in the Clean
Air Act that national attainment be achieved as expeditiously as practicable. This concern was reflected in the desire
that the due administration of the statutory scheme not be impeded by endless litigation over technical and
procedural irregularities.‖ United States Steel Corp., 605 F.2d at 290.
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Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d at 804.
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Most important, the mere existence of a deadline is not sufficient for establishing good cause. See, e.g.,
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Courts have viewed 49
and 60 days as sufficiently ―tight,‖ but not 12 months, 14 months, and 18 months. National Women, Infants, and
Children Grocers Ass‘n v. Food and Nutrition Service, 416 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing cases
mostly from the courts of appeals).
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Id.
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LUBBERS, supra note 107, at 111. For example, interim final rulemaking that precedes final rulemaking is
more acceptable. American Transfer & Food Storage v. Interstate Commerce Comm‘n, 719 F.2d 1283, 1294 (5th
Cir. 1983).
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LUBBERS, supra note 107, at 112.

Congress may, of course, simultaneously set deadlines and explicitly waive APA requirements in a statutory
scheme, as it has occasionally done. For example, Section 161(d) under Title I of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 prescribed that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Commodity Credit
Corporation promulgate regulations within 90 days ―without regard to . . . the notice and comment provisions of
section 553 of title 5, United States Code.‖ 7 U.S.C. § 7281. See also 16 U.S.C. § 3831 (requiring regulations
implementing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and
Pandemic Influenza to be issued within 90 days ―without regard to . . . the notice and comment provisions of
section‖); 7 U.S.C. § 1522 note (mandating that ―[n]ot later than August 1, 2001, the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation shall promulgate final regulations to carry out section 522(b) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act . . .
without regard to . . . the notice and comment provisions of section 553‖).
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unambiguous and to strike down agency attempts to modify it. But deadlines may make a
reviewing court less skeptical of rushed agency action, upholding more agency actions against
arbitrary and capricious challenges.
1. Chevron
In the familiar Chevron framework, courts engage in a two-part inquiry in examining an
agency interpretation of a statute:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.129
Recent case law appears to have added a prior Chevron Step Zero to this analysis.130 United
States v. Mead Corp.131 and its progeny suggest the degree of deference courts owe to an
agency‘s statutory interpretation is a partial function of the procedures used to generate an
agency decision.132 Judicial deference is appropriate ―when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖133
How do statutory deadlines fit into this Chevron framework? Consider Step Zero. If the
agency failed to use notice and comment procedures because of a deadline, the lack of formal
procedures might indicate Chevron deference ought not to apply.134 After Mead, informal
procedures (e.g. interpretive rules or guidance documents) are less likely to receive judicial
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
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See Cass. R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). The term is originally from Thomas
W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
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533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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See generally Sunstein, supra note 130; Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 347 (2003).
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Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.

Recent statements suggest procedural formality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
deference, but that judicial deference is much more likely when agency views are articulated using more formal
procedures like notice and comment. Mead‘s language initially appeared to make Step Zero turn entirely on
procedural formality. Unfortunately, the precise relationship between the delegation of force-of-law authority and
procedural formality remained elusive. The Court clearly stated that a lack of procedural formality does not preclude
Chevron deference. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (―The fact that the tariff classification here was not a product of such
formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.‖). And at least Justice Breyer thinks
procedural formality is not a sufficient condition for Chevron deference either. See National Cable &
Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–05 (2005) (Breyer concurring).
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deference. By the same token, if the agency had ―good cause‖ to avoid notice and comment, the
rule is a perfectly valid legislative rule. Because most legislative rules will qualify for deference
at Step Zero, the deadline could make it easier for the agency to receive deference for views
articulated informally.
This latter possibility is tempered by the way deadlines are analyzed at Chevron Step
One. Explicit statutory deadlines usually prevent agencies from changing or ignoring those
timetables for themselves135 or for regulated entities136 to avoid conflict with clear congressional
intent. Congress‘s intent about the timing of agency actions in explicit deadline statutes is not
ambiguous. By contrast, absent a deadline, statutory silence generates sufficient ambiguity to
provide for agency discretion and judicial deference with respect to timing.137
2. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA prescribes that the ―reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖ In assessing
whether the agency has acted in an arbitrary or capricious matter, courts generally engage in a
searching inquiry, including whether an agency has ―examine[d] the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‗rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.‘‖ 138

135

See, e.g., Delaney v. E.P.A., 898 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1990) (―When Congress has explicitly set an
absolute deadline, congressional intent is clear ... The EPA cannot extract leeway from a statute that Congress
explicitly intended to be strict.‖); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712
(D.C. Cir. 1974); infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007 WL 1748069 (D.C.
Cir. June 19, 2007) (―Congress has spoken on the question and has not provided EPA with authority under [the
statute] to extend the compliance date in [its] 2006 rule.‖); Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 311
F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2002) (―In sum, Congress addressed in great detail the circumstances under and extent to
which the EPA could grant exceptions to the nonattainment schedule. Extensions where the failure is the result of
transported ozone are not among them. It may well be, as the EPA and the states contend, that Congress has adopted
a foolish and uneconomical scheme. . . . But under our system of government, it is not our business or the EPA's
business to rewrite a clear statute so that it will better reflect ‗common sense and the public weal.‘‖); Abramowitz v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 832 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1987) (―Although it is axiomatic
that a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, it is equally well
established that a court cannot defer to agency discretion when the intent of the Act is clear. . . . We conclude that
EPA exceeded its authority by approving [particular regulatory] measures . . . without requiring a demonstration
[that the statutory deadline would be met].‖), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2406-07. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 22 F.3d
1125, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (permitting the agency to extend statutory deadlines for compliance in particular
circumstances).
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Might a court find a statute‘s timing provisions ambiguous, thereby satisfying Chevron Step One, but
nonetheless conclude the agency‘s interpretation of those provisions is unlawful? This eventuality is possible, but
not particularly likely. Although there are court decisions in which agencies lose at Step Two, such an outcome is
rare. See generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253
(1997).
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Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal citations
omitted).
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Little caselaw directly addresses deadlines in arbitrary and capricious review, but the
inquiry could have several critical implications for agency behavior. On the one hand, when
agencies are forced to promulgate rules, courts could apply a less searching standard for actions
promulgated under deadline,139 requiring less from the agency, in terms of procedure or
substance.140 This idea of reducing the intensity of arbitrary and capricious review because of
statutory deadlines,141 or agency resource constraints142 has been advocated by a number of
scholars, but case law on point is scarce and there are sensible reasons to resist ad hoc exceptions
to standard doctrines of judicial review.
Agencies may act poorly when rushed—not considering necessary alternatives, not
explaining their choices, or not acting consistent with standard doctrinal requirements. Standard
arbitrary and capricious review requires courts to strike down an agency action as arbitrary and
capricious ―if the agency . . . relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [was] so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.‖143 When agencies
sacrifice deliberative process to meet deadlines, decisions are more likely to fail the arbitrary and
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As Jack Beermann explains, in the context of judicial deadlines,
Courts might . . . be reluctant to cast doubt on the legality of rules in . . . situations in which agencies
promulgate rules under external compulsion. . . . Under the influence of a court decree, an agency may
issue a rule that deviates from actual administrative preferences. One could argue that the agency did not
seriously consider comments that were contrary to the push or pull of the external force such as the judicial
order.

Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 1002 (2003). Cf. Pierce, supra note 7,
at 74-75, 88 (discussing Judge Easterbrook‘s view that courts should ―rela[x]‖ their review of actions completed by
resource-starved agencies).
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Some limited caselaw also supports this argument. In California Human Development Corporation v. Brock,
the D.C. Circuit upheld an allocation of funds by the Department of Labor as rational given a deadline:
The DOL‘s actions were rational, given the information that the DOL had at the time the agency
promulgated the regulations. Complex decisions had to be made in a short time span. The change in
allocation pattern was mainly due to the substitution of the 1980 Census data for the 1977 Social Security
data. ―[T]hat choice must be laid at the doorstep of the Congress.‖ At least for the DOL's fiscal year 1983
and 1984 allocations, this court cannot find the agency‘s allocation formula to be arbitrary and capricious.
762 F.2d 1044, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); cf. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91(D.C. Cir. 1978)
(explicitly relying on the presence of a statutory deadline to uphold the agency‘s questionable actions in a Section
557(b) challenge under the APA).
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Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. Rev.
1013, 1027 (2000); R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots of the Judicial Dilemma, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 585 (1997); R.
Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN L. REV. 245 (1992).
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See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 90 (1997); Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 7, at 45. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985).
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
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capricious inquiry. And if courts do not relax ordinary requirements, then agencies will lose
more often in challenges to deadline actions.144
E. Judicial Remedies
Statutory schemes that impose deadlines on agency action rarely explicitly permit agencies or
courts to modify those deadlines, but some exceptions do exist.145 The Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), for instance, sets strict deadlines for agencies to release non-exempted information.
Agencies have only twenty days, with the possibility of a ten-day extension, ―to determine . . .
whether to comply with [a] request and . . . [to] immediately notify the person making such
request of such determination and the reasons therefore, and of the right of such person to appeal
to the head of the agency any adverse determination . . . .‖146 The statute expressly allows,
however, the court to grant the agency additional time if the agency meets certain
requirements.147 Indeed, many agencies almost never meet these statutory deadlines.
Most statutes that impose deadlines are silent about what should happen if the agency
misses the deadline. Courts generally ―will not blindly enforce a time limit without regard to the
reasonableness of the agency‘s action.‖148 Instead, courts can, without express authorization in
the statute, give an agency more time to comply with a deadline if it would be impossible for the
agency, operating in good faith, to meet it.149 For example, in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, the D.C. Circuit noted two circumstances where the court could use its
equitable powers to provide the agency additional time: when meeting deadlines would unduly
jeopardize the implementation of other essential programs and where compliance is
technologically impossible.150
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Cf. Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1995) (―understaffing is not a defense to a violation of
principles of administrative law‖). See also Pierce, supra note 7, at 73-75.
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See Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisal,
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 178 (1981).
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510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (―First, it is possible that budgetary commitments and manpower
demands required to complete the guidelines by [the statutory deadline] are beyond the agency‘s capacity or would
unduly jeopardize the implementation of other essential programs. Second, [the agency] may be unable to conduct
sufficient evaluation of available control technology to determine which is the best practicable or may confront
problems in determining the components of particular industrial discharges.‖). This case has generated considerable
controversy and distinctions. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 171 n.5 (N.D. Cal.1987);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 569 (D.D.C. 1986); State of New York v. Gorsuch, 554
F. Supp. 1060, 1065 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Courts agree, however, that the agency bears the ―heavy‖ burden of
―establishing impossibility or infeasibility of issuing regulations within the statutory time frame . . . .‖ Sierra Club v.
Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. Cal. 1987). And not surprisingly, courts are typically hesitant to find
impossibility or infeasibility in the face of clear congressional desires. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174
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When an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline, the reviewing court may sometimes
remand the case to the agency with a new judicial deadline, pursuant to specific authority under
the APA and general equitable powers to fashion adequate remedies.151 Courts, however,
exercise this authority rarely.152 Courts may, of course utilize other options besides imposing
their own deadlines on agencies. Courts often order a dilatory agency to propose a new deadline
it promises to meet.153 Or, courts will simply declare that the agency should act expeditiously,
perhaps suggesting a target date for completion.154 In sum, courts can enforce statutory
mandates, even if those deadlines have passed, in a myriad of ways. Whether courts elect to do
so and with what frequency naturally affects the desirability of using deadlines in statutes to
control agencies.
F. OIRA Review and Constitutional Law
The deadline doctrines above rest on a fundamental assumption, mainly, that deadlines
are constitutionally unproblematic. Although the use of statutory deadlines appears to be readily
accepted in law and politics, it is worth pausing to consider whether there is any plausible
constitutional problem with deadlines in administrative law.
F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
797 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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See In re International Chemical Workers Union, 958 F.2d at 1149 (APA authority); Biodiversity Legal
Foundation v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) (equitable authority). But when courts do impose
judicial deadlines, they essentially create hammer provisions of their own. In Northwest Environmental Advocates v.
Environmental Protection Agency, the Northern District of California gave the EPA two years to establish
regulations for ballast water discharges from vessels at American ports. The court also ruled that at the end of the
two years it would vacate a rule exempting such discharges from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System under the Clean Water Act. 2006 WL 2669042, at *13-*15.
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See In re International Chemical Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (―There is a point
when the court must ―let the agency know, in no uncertain terms, that enough is enough,‖ and we believe that point
has been reached. We are not unmindful of OSHA‘s need to ―juggle competing rulemaking demands on its limited
scientific and legal staff,‖ but we think the delay in promulgating a final rule that OSHA believes is necessary to
workers‘ well-being has been too lengthy for us to temporize any longer. We accept OSHA‘s estimate of the
additional time it needs to complete the final stages of the rulemaking, but we insist that there be no postponement
beyond the August 31, 1992 target date. Any additional delay would violate this court‘s order.‖). 2006 WL 2669042,
at *13-*14.
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See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1994) (―In enacting
environmental legislation, and providing for citizen suits to enforce its directives, Congress can only act as a human
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See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(―Although we dictate no fixed date for issuance of a final rule, we do direct OSHA to proceed on a priority,
expedited basis and to issue a permanent standard as promptly as possible . . . . Under the circumstances presented
here, i.e., the significant risk of grave danger to human life, and the time OSHA has already devoted . . ., we expect
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Agencies face procedural mandates not only from the APA and other statutes, but also
from an array of White House requirements. Although statutory deadlines are typically designed
to constrain agency action, they can sometimes have the unintended consequence of allowing
agencies to subvert other requirements. A major shift in the past twenty five years has been
renewed interest, both in scholarship and in practice, of Presidential Administration, the assertion
of greater centralized control by the President over many aspects of administrative process.155
The President has always had nominal control over non-independent agencies, and a degree of
influence on independent agencies because of the appointments power.156 But starting with
President Reagan‘s Executive Order in the early 1980‘s, and its subsequent revisions by
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, Presidents have sought greater ex ante control of
proposed agency policies.157 This is not the place to rehash the Presidential Administration
debates, but the growing influence of OMB‘s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) on administrative agencies has genuine implications for the law of deadlines.
Under Executive Order 12,866, as amended by Executive Order 13,422, non-independent
agencies must seek OMB review of legally binding rules, typically prior to issuing notice as well
as prior to promulgating the final rule, as well as of significant guidance documents.158 Although
Executive Order 12,866 mandates that agencies notify OMB of any statutory or judicial
deadlines and, ―to the extent practicable, schedule rulemaking proceedings so as to permit
sufficient time for [OMB] to conduct its review,‖159 deadlines for agency action may permit the
agency to forego that process or to ignore OMB objections.160 Although the Executive Orders do
not permit judicial review, courts have occasionally commanded agencies to meet their discrete
mandatory obligations even if the OMB has not approved the regulatory action.161 After all,
Executive Order 12,866 states that ―[n]othing in this order shall be construed as displacing the
agencies‘ authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.‖162
Since the Clinton Administration, an increasing proportion of agency actions must be
―cleared‖ by OIRA.163 The most recent Executive Order on this matter also requires that
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See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). Cf. Jack M. Beermann,
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157

Kagan, supra note 155.

158

See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,422,
72 Fed. Reg. 2703 (Jan. 18, 2007).
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Workers of Am., 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9.
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White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003).
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agencies consider formal rulemaking—a notoriously slow method of policy-making—in a wider
range of contexts.164 Agencies are also typically required to engage in some cost-benefit
justification of proposed rules, and elaborate analyses for significant rules.165 If OIRA slows the
average pace of agency action, and if Congress cares about the duration of agency processes,
then Congress might rely on deadlines to control an ever-increasing array of legislation. In the
process, statutory deadlines could undermine the prospects for effective OIRA review. The
Executive Orders establish a detailed timetable for the presentation and review of proposed
agency actions;166 meeting statutory deadlines may mean failing to meet Presidential
requirements.
What if statutory timing requirements conflict with executive procedural requirements?
Current law suggests the statutory deadline takes legal priority. The relevant Executive Orders
have always contained clauses indicating that they should be applied consistently with other
legal requirements. As the relevant deadline is part of a duly enacted statute, the OIRA timetable
likely yields. Still, this area of the law is nascent and strong predictions are difficult. Absent such
a disclaimer (or even with one), one could certainly invoke separation of powers principles to
argue that deadlines interfere with the President‘s ability to implement the law and manage
executive agencies. It is somewhat awkward to conclude that a statutory deadline interferes with
the President‘s duty under the take care clause, because the deadline is part of the law that the
President has duty to faithfully implement. But if stringent statutory duties in issue area X reduce
the ability of the President to implement policy in issue area Y, then perhaps Congress has
impermissibly interfered with Article II authority. If the courts concluded that the use of
deadlines to countermand the Executive Orders governing regulatory review raised a serious
constitutional question, courts might well apply the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret
the statute.167 This canon counsels that as between two interpretations, one of which raises a
constitutional question and the other of which does not, a court ought to adopt the interpretation
that avoids the constitutional question.
In recent years the President has issued a growing number of signing statements
announcing his interpretation of the statute being signed.168 Although their legal status remains
debated, suppose the President issued a signing statement saying that he interprets a statutory
deadline requiring final rules by December 31, 2010 to include an implicit caveat to mean ―if at
all possible consistent with the requirements of OIRA review.‖ The interpretation favored by the
canon of avoidance might well be the one proffered by the President. The saving construction
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Exec. Order No. 13,422, § 5.

165

Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a).

166

Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b).

167
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would require the new agency rule to be issued by the deadline unless other relevant and
permissible factors dictate otherwise. As noted, there is an active debate (particularly in
immigration law) about whether to relax standards of judicial review under conditions of agency
strain.169 Adherents of the relaxed review school would often allow agencies to ignore statutory
deadlines in much the way that the saving interpretation would do so in this hypothetical.
The implications might be significant were a pro-regulation Democratic Congress to face
off against a strongly anti-regulation Republican President. An anti-regulation President could
consistently use OIRA review to impede or block entirely new agency regulations. Presidential
bias against new regulations, however, is hardly the only value at stake in OIRA review. More
centralized Presidential control and oversight over intra-agency and inter-agency regulatory
agendas has long been said to potentially produce more efficient and effective risk regulation.170
Nor is congressional interference with the OIRA Executive Orders far-fetched. Various
legislators in the current period Congress have sought to counter changes to OIRA review. A
provision in the House appropriations legislation adopted by the chamber contained a clause
forbidding the White House from expending any funds to implement the new Executive Order.171
As the White House seeks to ratchet up control of administrative agencies, congressional
counter-moves grow ever more likely.
G. Summary
We have surveyed many instances of deadline doctrines in administrative law. First,
under the rubric of reviewability, the existence of a statutory deadline often makes review of
agency inaction more likely. Second, the presence of a deadline increases the probability that
agencies will successfully avoid notice and comment procedural requirements pursuant to the
―good cause‖ exception in the APA. Third, deadlines have ambiguous effects on arbitrary and
capricious challenges. When agencies sacrifice deliberative process to meet deadlines, the odds
that existing decisions will fail to meet the State Farm factors grows. If judges apply relaxed
standards of review (as some judges do), agency actions may be more likely (or as likely) to
survive arbitrary and capricious challenges. Fourth, deadlines have two important effects, both of
which reduce the odds that an agency will receive judicial deference. At Chevron Step Zero, the
failure to use formal procedures may lower the probability of judicial deference. 172 But if courts
treat deadline actions as legislative rules, agencies could receive deference for informal
judgments more often. At Step One, an explicit deadline is less likely to generate statutory
ambiguity about timing requirements for agency actions. Together, these deadline doctrines
likely do more harm than good in administrative law, or so we now suggest.
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IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal analysis above suggests several normative
implications. However, we start with a caveat. Sometimes it is more important that rules exist
than that a rule be right; indeed, when rules serve only as coordination mechanisms for social
actors, the actual content of a rule may be arbitrary. For this subset of regulatory action, quicker
action is better because there is no tradeoff between content, process, and timing. The majority of
regulatory actions, however, are otherwise. When there is a right (or at least better) answer, our
work emphasizes several reasons to think that the number of deadlines used by Congress may be
sub-optimal. Earlier, we suggested that deadlines increase the probability of judicial review for
certain forms of agency inaction, make it easier for agencies to emerge victorious against
procedural challenges to the failure to utilize notice and comment, make it more difficult for
agencies to defend substantive challenges in the Chevron framework, and make it harder to
defeat arbitrary and capricious challenges if judges do not relax the ordinary standards of review.
Against this backdrop, how are agencies likely to respond? The mix of theory and data suggest
three likely effects.
First, some portion of the underlying distribution of actions that would likely have been
promulgated using notice and comment procedures will be issued using less formal mechanisms.
Because deadlines can constitute ―good cause‖ for avoiding notice and comment, and because
the ordinary costliness of notice and comment is exacerbated under time constraints, agencies
can be expected to opt out of these costly procedures more often. Many themes in administrative
law, be they democratic or technocratic, argue that notice and comment is the most desirable
form of agency action.173 For these schools of thought, deadlines should make administrative
behavior worse.
A second related effect derives from the Mead doctrine. Ordinarily, Mead provides a
counterweight for agencies considering informal decisionmaking mechanisms.174 Because
procedural formality typically allows an agency to qualify for Chevron deference,175 agencies
that prefer deference from courts in litigation will tend towards more procedural formality,
notwithstanding the additional costs.176 Some current deadline doctrines undermine this
incentive. Because statutory deadlines are often taken to signal congressional clarity under Step
One of Chevron, the probability that judicial deference will be given to agency views is
marginally lower. Thus, deadlines not only give agencies a way to avoid notice and comment
rulemaking, but they also weaken an otherwise-existing incentive to use notice and comment.
However, recall the alternative that courts treat deadline actions not promulgated using
notice and comment as ―good cause‖ actions. If Step Zero allows deference in these scenarios,
the temptation to avoid notice and comment and still receive Chevron deference will be all the
greater. Although we do not want to romanticize informal rulemaking, the dominant trend in the
173
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courts and commentary has clearly been towards more notice and comment rather than less.
Deadline doctrines are then a consequential exception to this general rule.
Third, arbitrary and capricious review requires that agencies must consider all required
factors, not consider any precluded factors, and clearly explain the link between the evidence in
the record and the ultimate policy choice.177 Although the arbitrary and capricious doctrine does
not demand procedural formality, some degree of adequate formality is often required implicitly.
If courts do not give agencies greater leeway because of the deadline, then agencies will be more
likely to lose arbitrary and capricious challenges. If agencies do not have sufficient time to
adequately consider and evaluate relevant factors or evidence, all else equal, decisions are more
likely to be overturned as arbitrary and capricious. If judges do give agencies more leeway when
deadlines are present, agencies will not lose in litigation, but greater uncertainty and instability in
administrative law will be generated because of ad hoc exceptions to long-stable doctrine.
Neither of these alternatives strikes us as particularly desirable in many contexts. The
first results in lower quality agency actions that are more likely to be struck down, resulting in
more administrative delay rather than less. The second carves out an ad hoc exception to
standard administrative law requirements. Although others suggest such an exception would be
desirable,178 we remain skeptical. If judges are less likely to strike down deadline actions on
arbitrary and capricious grounds, it is at least relevant that an important check on agency
behavior is weakened. Administrative deadlines do seem to speed up agency action, but the
assorted deadline doctrines also likely shift agency decisions out of notice and comment, may
increase delay in the ultimate implementation of rules, and cause greater confusion and
uncertainty in administrative law.
Deadlines also seem to shift internal agency resources away from policy programs
without deadlines in favor of policy programs with deadlines. 179 Many strains of administrative
law seek to preserve the agency‘s ability to allocate internal resources. 180 Agency decisions not
to enforce or adjudicate are defended on this ground; the extraordinary deference given to agency
decisions not to act generally, as well as the presumption against reviewability of certain agency
inactions, are founded, in part, on the idea that agencies are better than courts at managing their
own internal affairs. Setting aside concerns about the internal coherence of administrative law, to
evaluate the normative status of deadlines on this front, we need to know whether the existing
allocation of agency resources is desirable; whether relative institutional capacities suggest that
Congress, agencies, or courts should make that decisions about agency resources; and if the
existing allocation is not desirable, and if Congress is an appropriate institutional decisionmaker,
whether deadlines are a sensible (lowest-cost) mechanism for adjusting the allocation.
To the extent that deadlines are often used in risk regulation, the existing literature
provides several reasons to be skeptical of deadlines. First, there is a general tendency to favor
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new high profile risks for regulation over older, more familiar risks that may be more serious.181
This new risk bias produces an inefficient allocation of resources because older, more serious
risks are not given their appropriate share of resources.182 If deadlines often accompany statutory
commands to address newly recognized risks (as they do), then deadlines will tend to exacerbate
the new risk bias rather than mitigate it. In a world of limited agency resources, a statutory
command to formulate regulations in a new policy area will inevitably reduce resources allocated
to other areas unless accompanied by a corresponding increase in budget, which seems not to be
the norm.183 Absent a deadline, an agency can at least allocate resources according to need and
importance across programs over time. The deadline removes one dimension of flexibility and
therefore likely worsens the misallocation problem from new risk bias.
Still, to know whether deadlines are good or bad for social welfare, political
accountability, regulatory policy or administrative law, one needs to compare not just the best
case scenario for a lack of deadlines with the worst case scenario for deadline driven action.
Absent the deadline, one possibility is that the agency would have spent the appropriate amount
of time and resources to select the optimal regulatory regime. Another is that the agency would
have taken too long to do the wrong thing. Still another possibility is that the agency would have
done nothing. If a statutory deadline shifts outcomes from either of these latter two outcomes,
then deadlines could easily make the regulatory world better.184
Suppose the existing allocation of agency resources is incorrect. Are congressional
deadlines a sensible way to calibrate? Congress regularly makes decisions about agency
resources. Congress specifies an agency‘s budget; Congress creates, removes, or expands agency
jurisdiction; and Congress mandates or forbids that agencies address certain policy problems. So
long as these other forms of resource allocation are uncontroversial, we are hard pressed to see
why comparative institutional competence arguments demand that Congress avoid deadlines on
this ground.
On the other hand, there is something mildly awkward about a legislature that admittedly
does not have access to the agency‘s expertise not only making judgments about the internal
allocation of agency resources, but also doing so indirectly, by using deadlines rather than
directly using budgeting authority or clear statutory commands.185 If so, then a remaining
question is whether deadlines are a particularly objectionable mechanism for allocating agency
resources, even if there are no good grounds for objecting to congressional reallocation of
181
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agency resources as a general matter. One such concern might be that the reallocation is
transient. Prior to the deadline, resources must be reallocated, but after the deadline, the agency
could revert to the old allocation, which (by working assumption) is incorrect.
Alternatively, the use of congressional deadlines to shift resources is troubling if a
common byproduct is to lower the quality of regulatory decisions. Tentative theoretical and
empirical evidence suggests this is so.186 If deadline actions are worse than non-deadline actions,
deadline actions should be struck down more often by courts, which will produce more delay,
and arguably a greater displacement of agency resources than Congress originally intended.
Thus, even if the actual shift in resources is desirable, the overall consequences of using
deadlines to accomplish the shift are somewhat suspect.187
The simple point is that there are risks as well as benefits from statutory deadlines, both
in terms of social welfare and political accountability.188 Deadlines may sometimes ensure that
important policy is generated and implemented quickly, effectively, and efficiently. But
deadlines can also produce a range of negative side-effects, distorting agency procedures and
reducing the quality of decisions. If deadlines reduce the quality of agency actions, then actions
will be prompt but not high quality. If courts strike down the low-quality actions, then ultimate
agency policy will be of reasonable quality, but not timely. If Congress generally prefers agency
decision-making process that allows for public input, the development of expertise, and reasoned
deliberation, none of these goals are necessarily served well by deadlines. Deadlines are,
therefore, unlikely to be a panacea for remedying the pathologies of regulatory policy.
A main effect of deadlines is democratic, helping the legislature to control the behavior
of its agents, which in turn helps voters control their representatives. Deadlines can also serve
political interests in a narrower partisan sense. If deadlines are used as a mechanism for
controlling agency problems, then they should be used more often when agencies have
preferences further from the legislature. More deadlines should be enacted during periods of
divided government. Congress should also more often impose deadlines on agencies that are
perceived to be further from legislative ideal points.
In part, these are empirical predictions, but they have normative implications as well.
Deadlines imposed in particular political configurations may result in less effective regulatory
policy. If less-centralized regulatory policy in the Executive branch causes fewer systematic
inter-agency and inter-risk tradeoffs, then deadlines are likely to produce worse net policy. But
deadlines may also create more effective policy if they are imposed on agencies that would
otherwise do very little to improve social welfare under strong executive control. In other words,
there may be less coordination and inter-risk tradeoffs with more deadlines, but there may be
more socially beneficial regulatory policy overall because agencies acting on their own are
forced to enact beneficial regulations they would not otherwise implement without deadlines.
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Again, the proper comparison should not presume coordinated Executive control at its
best. Rather, given a particular political configuration, the costs to weakened coordination from
deadlines must be weighed against the benefits to regulatory outputs that would not occur but for
deadlines, or would occur much more slowly. Ironically, even if deadlines improve social
welfare, they may undermine democratic accountability in another important sense. To the extent
that the President is more representative of the national electorate, a deregulatory Administration
whose agencies do very little may comport better with voter preferences than a congressional
committee with preferences different than the congressional median that imposes deadlines to
force particular regulatory actions. But to the extent that Congress is more representative,189
deadlines may promote political accountability.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH
Before concluding, we emphasize potential future research that follows on our findings..
Deadlines reallocate resources away from programs without deadlines and towards programs
with deadlines. If the resource-allocation hypothesis is correct, then deadlines in one policy
should produce an increase in the expected duration of agency actions in other policy areas that
the agency implements. Alternatively, if deadlines lower the quality of average agency
decisions,190 then it should be the case that actions with deadlines are more likely to be struck
down in post-enactment legal challenges than agency actions that are not subject to deadlines.
Assuming that the quality of agency decisionmaking is positively correlated with courts
sustaining agency action, then agency rules of lower quality should, all else equal, be more likely
to be overturned. Nevertheless, deadlines may also signal clear congressional intent, making
courts more likely to remand without vacatur in these cases.
We leave these issues for another day. For now, we hope to have shown that deadlines
are a central and poorly understood feature of the modern administrative state. Moreover,
deadlines may be doing more harm than good in the administrative state. Deadlines do quicken
agency action, but they also produce policy resulting from systematically different
decisionmaking processes that are less intensive than the norm. Deadlines seem to trade timing
against quality or at least process. When deadline actions get to court, judges apply doctrines that
run counter to many existing strands of administrative law, either undermining desirable
incentives for agency behavior or making it more likely that sub-par agency decisions will be
given legal effect. Deadlines are not uniformly undesirable, of course, but nor are they are a
panacea for the problem of regulatory delay. The theoretical, empirical, doctrinal, and normative
analysis emphasizes the importance of deadlines not only for administrative law, but also
institutional design and democratic theory more generally.
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Table 1. Deadlines by Year
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Statutory
49
90
131
93
229
244
149
109
73
110
119
49
32
101
19
22
16

Judicial
1
7
15
11
12
12
25
38
37
21
21
40
28
45
57
44
54

Total
50
97
146
104
241
256
174
147
110
131
140
89
60
146
76
66
70

Percent Statutory
98.00
92.78
89.73
89.42
95.02
95.31
85.63
74.15
66.36
83.97
85.00
55.06
53.33
69.18
25.00
33.33
22.86

Percent Judicial
2.00
7.22
10.27
10.58
4.98
4.69
14.37
25.85
33.64
16.03
15.00
44.94
46.67
30.82
75.00
66.67
77.14

Data: Total number of judicial and statutory deadlines reported by all agencies, with actual dates,
by year (of deadline date). Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1983-October 2003; most
recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Figure 1. Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 1986-2003
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Data: Total number of judicial and statutory deadlines reported by all agencies, with actual dates,
by year (of deadline date). Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1983-October 2003; most
recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 2. Deadlines by Agency
Agency
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board
CEQ
CFTC
Civil Aeronautics Board
Commission on Civil Rights
Corporation for National and Community Service
Court Services & Offender Supervision Agency for
DC
CPSC
DHS
DOC
DOC-NOAA
DOC-PTO
DOD
DOD-Air Force
DOD-Army
DOD-Navy
DOD-Office of the Secretary
DOE
DOE-Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
DOI
DOI-FWS
DOJ
DOJ-INS
DOL
DOT
DOT-Coast Guard
DOT-FAA
DOT-FHA
DOT-FMCSA
DOT-FRA
DOT-NHTSA
Education
EEOC
EPA
EPA-Air and Radiation

ID
3010

Statutory
0

Judicial
0

Total
0

3014
331
3038
3024
3035
3045

6
0
11
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

6
0
11
0
1
0

3225
3041
1601
605
648
651
710
701
702
703
790
1901
1904
1004
1018
1103
1115
1205
2105
2115
2120
2125
2126
2130
2127
1800
3046
2002
2060

1
5
1
1
645
14
2
0
0
0
140
5
31
8
110
1
33
15
18
28
21
47
18
31
49
0
5
0
218

0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
130
0
1
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
184

1
5
1
1
663
14
2
0
0
0
140
5
31
8
240
1
34
15
20
30
21
47
18
31
49
0
5
0
402
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Agency
EPA-Solid Waste and Emergency Response
EPA-Water
Farm Council for the Arts and Humanities
Farm Credit Administration
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation
FCC
FDIC
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Housing Finance Board
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Federal Reserve System
FEMA
FMC
FTC
General: DOD, GSA, NASA
GSA
HHS
HHS-CMMS
HUD
ICC
Institute of Museum and Library Services
Merit Systems Protection Board
MK Udall Foundation
NARA
NASA
National Capital Planning Commission
National Credit Union Administration
National Indian Gaming Commission
NEA
NEH
NLRB
NRC
NSF
Office of Federal Inspector, Alaska Natural Gas
Transportation System
Office of Government Ethics
Office of Special Counsel
OMB
OPIC
OPM
Panama Canal Commission
Peace Corps

42

ID
2050
2040
3134
3052
3055
3060
3064
3068
3069
3076
7100
3067
3072
3084
9000
3090
905
938
2501
3120
3137
3124
3320
3095
2700
3125
3133
3141
3135
3136
3142
3150
3145

Statutory
44
49
0
4
2
28
23
2
2
0
25
9
11
6
47
29
30
119
20
1
0
0
0
3
7
0
11
0
1
1
0
2
3

Judicial
60
88
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total
104
137
0
4
2
29
23
2
2
0
25
9
11
7
47
31
31
123
20
1
0
0
0
3
7
0
11
0
1
1
0
2
3

3204
3209
3255
348
3420
3206
3207
420

0
0
1
3
0
36
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
3
0
36
1
0

Deadlines in Administrative Law
Agency
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation
Presidio Trust
Railroad Retirement Board
Resolution Trust Corporation
SBA
SEC
Selective Service System
State
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board
Treasury
Treasury-Customs
Treasury-IRS
TVA
USAID
USDA
USDA-Farm Service Agency
USDA-Food and Nutrition
USDA-Food Safety and Inspection Service
USDA-Rural Housing Service
USIA
USTR
VA

ID
3208
3212
3220
3205
3245
3235
3240
1400
3203
1505
1515
1545
3316
412
503
560
584
583
575
3116
350
2900

43
Statutory
1
0
2
4
25
25
0
26
2
12
22
37
1
1
1
151
58
2
30
0
0
13

Judicial
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Total
1
0
2
4
25
25
0
26
2
12
23
39
1
1
1
151
58
2
30
0
0
14
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Figure 2. Deadlines Over Time for Four Major Agencies

Data: Number of statutory deadlines reported by USDA, EPA, HHS, and DOT, with actual dates,
by year (of deadline date). Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1983-October 2003; most
recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 3. Simple Correlation of Judicial and Statutory Deadlines
Correlation
Coefficient

P value

N

Pearson

0.042

<0.000

32,694

Kendall Tau B

0.049

<0.000

32,694

Spearman’s Rho

0.049

<0.000

32,694

Data: Correlation between number of statutory deadlines and judicial deadlines reported, with
and without actual dates, by RIN. One-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports,
April 1988-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 4. Categorical Association of Statutory and Judicial Deadlines
Statutory Deadline Only

2475

Judicial Deadlines Only

332

Statutory and Judicial Deadlines 81
No Deadlines

29806

Data: Number of RINs reporting statutory deadlines only, judicial deadlines only, both statutory
and judicial deadlines, and no deadlines, all with and without actual dates. Source: Unified
Agenda reports, April 1988-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries
were deleted.
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Table 5. Significant Rules and Deadlines
Any Deadline

Statutory Deadline

No Deadline

Significant Rules

616

482

3704

Non-Significant Rules

1201

1057

14959

33.90 %

31.32 %

19.85 %

Percent Significant

Data: Number of RINs (stratified by whether the RIN is significant or non-significant) reporting
any deadline, any statutory deadline, and no deadline, with and without actual dates. Source:
Unified Agenda reports, April 1995-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier
entries were deleted.
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Table 6. Simple Correlation of Significant Regulatory Action and Presence of Any Deadline
Correlation
Pearson
Kendall Tau B
Spearman‘s Rho

Coefficient
0.098
0.098
0.098

P value
<0.000
<0.000
<0.000

N
20,480
20,480
20,480

Data: Correlation between significance of regulatory action and presence of any deadline, with
and without an actual date, by RIN. Two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda
reports, April 1995-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were
deleted.

Deadlines in Administrative Law

49

Table 7. Simple Correlations of Deadlines and Regulation Type
Regulatory Characteristic

Simple Correlation Coefficient

N

Unfunded Government Mandate

0.033

32,694

Unfunded Private Mandate

0.069

32,694

State Government

0.127

32,694

Local Government

0.089

32,694

Tribal Government

0.046

32,694

Federal Government

0.116

32,694

Data: Correlation between particular regulatory characteristics and any deadlines reported, with
and without actual dates, by RIN. Correlation coefficient idential for Pearson, Kendall‘s Tau B,
and Spearman‘s Rho; two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1988October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.

Deadlines in Administrative Law

50

Table 8. Agency Decision Process and Deadlines
Any Deadline

Statutory Deadline

No Deadline

Interim Rules

359

355

2282

No Interim Rules

2529

2201

27524

12.43 %

13.89 %

7.66 %

5

4

230

2883

2552

29576

0.17 %

0.16 %

0.77 %

Percent Interim Rules
Direct Rules
No Direct Rules
Percent Direct Rules

Data: Number of RINs (stratified by whether the RIN had interim final rules or not (direct final
rules or not)) reporting any deadline, any statutory deadline, and no deadline, with and without
actual dates. Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1988-October 2003; most recent entry for an
RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 9. Simple Correlations of Agency Decision Process and Deadlines
Pearson Correlation
(p)
Interim Rules

Direct Rules

Kendall‘s Tau
(p)

Spearman‘s Rho
(p)

0.042

0.049

0.049

(<0.00)

(<0.00)

(<0.00)

n=32,694
-0.02
(<0.00)
n=32,694

n=32,694
-0.02
(<0.00)
n=32,694

n=32,694
-0.02
(<0.00)
n=32,694

Data: Correlation between types of rulemaking (direct final rules, interim final rules) and
presence of any deadline, with and without an actual date, by RIN. Two-tailed significance test.
Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1988-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was
kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 10. Simple Correlation of Comment Periods and Any Deadlines
Correlation Coefficient

P value

N

Pearson

0.049

<0.000

32,694

Kendall Tau B

0.041

<0.000

32,694

Spearman’s Rho

0.042

<0.000

32,694

Data: Correlation between number of comment periods (count goes up by 1 for a new comment
period, a reopened comment period, or an extended comment period) and any deadlines reported,
with and without actual dates, by RIN. Two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda
reports, April 1988-October 2003; most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were
deleted.
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Table 11. Simple Correlation between Significance, Deadlines, and Duration
Pearson Correlation

Kendall’s Tau

Spearman’s Rho

Regulatory
Significance

0.061
(p<0.001)
N=5776

0.071
(p<0.001)
N=5776

0.087
(p<0.001)
N=5776

Deadline Present

-0.054
(p<0.001)
N=5783

-0.048
(p<0.001)
N=5783

-0.058
(p<0.001)
N=5783

Data: Correlation between significance of regulatory action and duration (first line) and between
the presence of any deadline, with and without an actual date, and duration (second line), by
RIN. Two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, April 1995-October 2003;
most recent entry for an RIN was kept; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 12. Average Duration of Agency Action
Non-Deadlines

Deadlines

Mean

95 % CI

N

Mean

95 % CI

N

USDA

422.17

376.90-467.43

357

406.83

274.49-539.17

35

EPA

603.30

524.89-681.70

249

591.34

500.47-682.21

163

HHS

911.64

826.86-996.42

425

456.61

336.88-576.34

51

DOT

585.59

522.13-649.04

546

519.72

424.58-614.86

71
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Table 13. Estimates of Duration of Rulemakings
Covariate
Deadline
Regulatory Significance
NPRM in Divided
Government
Congressional Chance
Presidential Change
Carter
Reagan
Bush 41
Bush 43
Sign*Withdrawal
Deadline*Withdrawal
Divided Gov*W
CongChange*w
PresChange*W
Carter*W
Reagan*W
Bush41*W
Bush43*W

CPH
Coefficient
(SE clustered
on RIN)
0.355
(0.049)**
-0.250
(0.038)**
-0.033

Weibull
Coefficient
(SE)

OLS
Coefficient
(SE)

Poisson
Coefficient
(SE)

0.305
(0.040)**
-0.256
(0.033)**
-0.059

-124.782
(24.081)**
72.158
(18.722)**
268.522

-0.120
(0.001)**
0.043
(0.001)**
0.266

(0.034)
-1.336
(0.037)**
-1.632
(0.059)**
-0.824
(0.291)**
-0.522
(0.083)**
0.035
(0.068)
0.494
(0.034)**
0.010
(0.097)
-0.649
(0.159)**
-0.078
(0.105)
1.200
(0.138)**
-0.597
(0.146)**
-1.091
(0.577)
0.420
(0.145)**
0.125
(0.150)
-0.476
(0.167)**

(0.034)
-1.271
(0.037)**
-1.918
(0.047)**
-1.559
(0.282)**
-0.523
(0.076)**
0.009
(0.060)
0.514
(0.033)**

(18.786)**
394.309
(19.942)**
1,153.563
(23.224)**
4,864.863
(141.474)**
1,986.422
(44.360)**
612.549
(32.983)**
-436.179
(16.671)**

(0.001)**
0.714
(0.001)**
1.054
(0.001)**
1.022
(0.003)**
0.733
(0.001)**
0.317
(0.001)**
-0.644
(0.001)**

-8.996
(0.099)**
17852

242.540
(32.823)**
8950

5.657
(0.002)**
8950

Constant
Observations

17852

Covariates included in the CPH model but not significant: State Government, Local Government, Federal
Government, Tribal Government, State Government*Withdrawal, Local Government*Withdrawal, Federal
Government*Withdrawal, Tribal Government*Withdrawal Covariates for all agencies in the database (other
category was dropped) were also included. The following agencies had a significantly positive effect on duration
(negative effect on the hazard rate): USDA, DOD, DHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, Treasury, HHS, DOE, EPA, DOT, FCC,
ICC, NRC, and SEC. The following agencies had a significantly negative effect on duration (positive effect on the
hazard rate): DOC, Education, and SBA.
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